Virginia Tech CFP - Quarterfinals

Two absolute nail-biters, but it's the blowout that I cannot wrap my mind around

Note: All predicted scores and game stats come directly from the model. Scenarios and narratives from simulated games are fictional, but are an approximation based on my reading of the model-generated data combined with how the teams performed in real life, including their strengths, weaknesses, and tendencies. For example, if we see that a team lost by two touchdowns and threw a lot more passes than it averaged during the season, we can assume that it got down early, failed to establish the run, and started airing it out in an effort to get back into the game.

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While the entire point of this simulated tournament is to determine the greatest Virginia Tech team of the last 20 years, a byproduct of the process is tiering the teams themselves. Seeding is one thing, but the actual results were sure to draw lines of separation that were not clear before. There will likely be a small group of elite teams, a larger group of contenders, and still a larger group of also rans. This round, probably more than any, should go a long way toward separating the contenders from the elite and quantifying the differences between these two tiers.

Quarterfinal 1

#5 seed VT 2007 at #4 seed VT 2004

In my mind, these two teams always felt so different, but when scanning the stats, they are actually a lot a like, at least on the face of things. If we peel back the onion some, the differences become a bit more noticeable. The 2007 Hokies threw the ball a lot more than the 2004 team did, and it’s no wonder, given the 3.3 yards per carry any time they tried to run it. It’s not like the 2004 team was dynamic on the ground. In fact, at the time, the running game experienced a major decline from the 2003 season, when Kevin Jones ran for more than 1,400 yards, at an average of nearly six yards per carry. Ultimately, that last bit, yards per carry, is the most important distinction between the two teams in this first quarterfinal, at least entering the game. USC and Auburn had defenses that were as stingy as the 2007 Hokies, and they both shut down the VT running game. Might the 2004 Hokies struggle again to run the ball against a good defense?

In a word, sorta. In four words, sorta, but not really. Mike Imoh, Cedric Humes, and Bryan tallied 163 yards on 43 carries. The 3.7 YPC was down from their season average, but if the line struggled to get a consistent push, it did limit stops behind the line of scrimmage. With the run game churning out 3-5 yards on each attempt, Bryan Randall was able to hit on some big throws downfield, especially in the play action game.

For the 2007 Hokies, a team that many had considered a potential dark horse to make a run to the VT CFP Championship Game, things started badly and went downhill from there. On a third-and-six play on the 2007 team’s opening drive, Sean Glennon was hit from behind by a backside blitzer, fumbling in the process. The 2004 Hokies recovered, and four plays later, they were in the endzone.

After trailing 20-3 at the half, the 2007 team played Tyrod Taylor exclusively at quarterback in the second half. The freshman phenom did some damage with his legs, but the downfield passing game was nonexistent. Taylor was under constant pressure, and was often forced to bail on passing plays if his first read wasn’t open. Taylor did manage to lead a few scoring drives, which kept the score respectable, but from the second quarter on, this game was not in doubt.

Quarterfinal 2

#6 seed VT 2006 at #3 seed VT 2010

The second quarterfinal featured a matchup between one of Bud Foster’s best defensive units and undoubtedly the most prolific Frank ‘n Stiney offense. The flip side - the stoppable force (2006 offense) vs. the movable object (2010 defense) - is also intriguing, if less exciting. It is hard to quantify just how bad the 2006 offense was, but I’ll try. Brandon Ore ran for 1,100 yards, and yet the team yards per carry (3.2), matched that of the 2022 team. Ore, in fact, struggled on the road that season, running for only 266 yards on 3.7 YPC. The 2006 team’s 295 yards of total offense was only six yards more than the generationally bad 2022 team’s 289 yards. But here’s the kicker - the 2006 team turned the ball over nearly twice as many times per game (2.1) as the 2022 Hokies did (1.3). The 2006 team won 10 games because of Bud Foster and special teams. Surely there is no way this team could hope to make a game of it’s quarterfinal matchup, right?

Wrong. The defense was that good, and they were again in their game with the 2010 Hokies. After registering four shutouts during the regular season, the 2006 Hokies were not intimidated by Tyrod Taylor, Ryan Williams, Darren Evans, and the rest of that great 2010 offense. They harassed Taylor on every dropback and turned the game into the football equivalent of trench warfare.

The 2006 defense was at its best following turnovers by its offense. Twice they took the field on their side of the fifty in a sudden change situation, and twice they kept the 2010 team off the scoreboard. Still, Taylor was efficient at QB for the 2010 team, despite throwing a couple interceptions (only one of which was really his fault - the other was a tipped pass at the line of scrimmage). No surprise - the difference in the outcome resulted from the 2010 team’s ability to run the ball, especially down the stretch. Clinging to a one-point lead, Darren Evans converted two crucial third downs with runs of four and five yards, respectively, to help seal the win.

Quarterfinal 3

#7 seed VT 2016 at #2 seed VT 2009

The third quarterfinal game matched Justin Fuente’s best Virginia Tech team (2016) against one of Frank Beamer’s best post-Michael Vick teams (2009). On paper, the 2016 offense was stronger, with the notable caveat about snap issues and stupid penalties. Averaged out of the entire season, turnovers were not a huge problem, but the 2016 Hokies lost a ton of fumbles in the first half of the season. In addition, I do think there is some bias in the season stats.

Both teams played that season’s eventual National Champion and lost. The 2016 team played Clemson in the ACC Championship game, losing 42-35 after failing to convert a fourth-and-medium opportunity at the edge of the redzone in the final minute. The 2009 team lost to Alabama 34-24 in the opening week of that season, letting a 17-16 lead entering the fourth quarter evaporate as fatigue set in for the defense. The big difference was that the 2016 team played Clemson in the postseason, when the offense was clicking on all cylinders. The 2009 team played the Crimson Tide and Nebraska (which had an elite defense that year) in the first three weeks of the season, when the Hokies were still trying to gel as an offense and fully grasp what they had in Ryan Williams. All of that is reflected in the game-by-game stats, and the model should give it some credence.

This game turned into another nail-biter. Back and forth they went, trading punches. With five minutes to go in the game, and trailing 23-21, the 2016 team faced 2nd and 8 from their own 34-yard line. Jerod Evans ran what looked initially like a pop pass. The 2016 Hokies, however, broke tendency with a brilliant wrinkle. As 2010 safety Eddie Whitley followed his key and sprinted forward to cover Sam Rogers coming out of the backfield, Evans threw a deep post to Cam Phillips in the vacated zone. The throw was on target, Phillips made the reception, then he outran the defense for the go-ahead score.

Now down 28-23, and needing a touchdown to win, the 2009 Hokies embarked on a 17-play, 86-yard drive that chewed up all but 19 seconds. Tyrod Taylor scored the game winning touchdown when he scrambled away from the initial rush and outran the spying middle linebacker, Andrew Motuapuaka, to the pylon. The two-point conversion failed, but the lead held, as did the sense that the 2009 team stole one.

Quarterfinal 4

#9 seed VT 2017 at #1 seed VT 2005

The last of the quarterfinal games, another Beamer-Fuente matchup, looked more even on paper than many might suspect. Both teams had excellent defenses, loaded with future NFL stars. However, the 2017 offense was young at the skill positions and prone to dry spells, while the 2005 offense was experienced and stacked at every position. To some degree, the differences in the various offensive stats reflect advances in offensive philosophy (the adoption of spread principals by Fuente). The 2017 team threw the ball 111 times more than the 2005 team did. Not captured in the Pregame Matchup below are any stats around special teams, which were indeed special back in 2005. Combined with the #1 defense in the country, the 2005 punt return team (featuring Eddie Royal) gave Marcus Vick and the offense lots of short fields to work with. Thus, action (points) required less motion (yards). And the model knows that, as two separate special teams advanced metrics are included.

If there was going to be a blowout, I thought this game was the most likely candidate. Clearly, I underestimated the 2017 defense. They were masterful in this game, holding the 2005 offense to just 91 yards rushing on 44 carries. They also intercepted two Marcus Vick passes, both on the plus side of the field. However, on both occasions, the 2017 Hokies were held to field goals. On the day, three trips to the redzone resulted in three field goals for the 2017 team.

The 2005 team controlled this game from the first quarter on, but they struggled to put the game away. Their 17-6 halftime lead felt simultaneously insurmountable and insufficient. After the 2017 team took the opening kickoff in third quarter and drove down for their third field goal, cutting the deficit to eight points, fans in Lane Stadium sensed, for the first time, the possibility of an upset. Those fears were quickly erased, as the 2005 team answered with 10 points of their own over the their next two drives. The lead was 27-12 late in the fourth quarter when Josh Jackson connected with Sean Savoy for that team’s only touchdown on the day. The two-point conversion failed, rendering the onside kick attempt moot.

Final Thoughts

I am still scratching my head over the 2007 team getting blown out by the 2004 team. I could see that being a 7- to 10-point defeat, but 19? That surprised me. But should it have? The 2007 team had a major flaw (offensive line) and did not play well in high profile games. The 2004 team did not have any major flaws, had great team chemistry, and played very well against top competition. Mental toughness, and composure in pressure situations were not factors that I had considered going into the VT CFP, mainly because they cannot be directly quantified. However, at this point, I think we have enough simulated examples to hypothesize that these factors are key drivers behind teams that overperform expectations.

The higher seeds all advanced out of the quarterfinals, although two did just barely. Through two rounds (eight games), the higher seed is 7-1. What does this tell us? Seeding is not a variable in the model, so it does not merit a direct benefit. The real benefit of being the higher seed has been homefield advantage. The 2017 team’s win over the 2013 team (which replaced the 2003 team, the original #8 seed) was the only road victory. I wonder if the trend will carry over to the CFP once it expands to 12 teams.

Now that we have reached the semi-finals, the remaining games will be played at neutral sites. The 2004 and 2010 teams were both 0-2 in high profile neutral site matchups, while the 2005 and 2009 teams split their two neutral site games. If you’re looking for an early advantage, I would start there, but don’t forget about x-factors like performance in big games (regardless of venue). The 2005 team wilted, while the 2004 and 2009 teams took every big game down to the wire. Perhaps a harbinger of things to come.