The Interplay Between QBs and the Offensive Line at Virginia Tech
A historical examination of VT's unique dependence on elite, in-state, dual threat quarterbacks
Detailed recruiting data are sourced from 247, except where noted. Summary data are sourced from the repository at collegefootballdata.com that I accessed via the cfbfastr API connection.
We are just shy of the February late signing date, so rather than starting in on themes around the 2023 class this week, I thought it prudent to wait on any late additions and instead focus on what I think is the single biggest part of the winning formula at Virginia Tech - the interplay between the offensive line and the quarterback. First, let’s start with the guys up front.
Offensive Line
Dating back to 2002, the state of Wisconsin has produced 11 four- or five-star offensive line recruits. All but one signed with the University of Wisconsin. In fact, 20 of the top 22 offensive line recruits by numerical rating signed with the Badgers. That goes across coaching staffs and, really, across eras of college football, even if Wisconsin’s offense has remained largely the same throughout that period. When Joe Rudolph was in Madison, he got pretty much all the top in-state talent.
But is that a Joe Rudolph thing, or something unique to the culture of the state? I suppose it’s a mix. Rudolph didn’t cause the players to flee, but the Badgers had built a wall around the state long before he arrived, and he benefited from it. Overall, according to the US Census Bureau, the state comprises 5.9 million people. Milwaukee is the largest city (578k), and Madison is a distant second (265k). Green Bay, in third place (107k), is basically a large town. The state has only one major college football program, and that’s where Rudolph coached. The key insight is that prior to coming to Blacksburg, Rudolph was in a situation in which he could get the lineman necessary to run the power rushing/playaction pass offense the Hokies sought to run last year. But the situation is different at Virginia Tech, and the coaching staff did not realize this until midway through the season.
There are 8.6 million people in the Commonwealth of Virginia. There are three population hubs (NOVA, Richmond, and the greater 757 area), but none of them are particularly close to Blacksburg. There is another P5, ACC school to the north (UVA) and two G5 programs (Liberty and Old Dominion).
Since 2002, the Commonwealth has produced 18 four- and five-star offensive lineman, and Tech signed four (Matt Welsh in 2003, Blake DeChristopher in 2007, Vinston Painter in 2008, and Austin Clark in 2015). That’s the most of any one school (UVA signed three such players), but far from sufficient to run a pro-style ground and pound offense.
The lack of true road graders up front puts the Hokies at a numerical disadvantage on some interval of plays. For example, perhaps on 1 in 2 rushing plays the Wisconsin left guard is able to block his initial man, then move up field and get the middle linebacker. Meanwhile, the Virginia Tech left guard might only make that second level block 1 time in 3 plays, or in bad years, 4. One extra limited rushing gain (or loss) per set of downs would put the Hokies at a distinct disadvantage. When Tech has been at its best, it counters in one of two ways:
With a strong-armed, NFL draftee pro-style QB and a deep group of receivers on the outside and very good running backs
With an elite dual-threat QB
Quarterbacks
Brent Pry was a graduate assistant at Virginia Tech from 1995-1997, and in his introductory press conference, he cited the 1995 win over Miami (great defensive game) and the Sugar Bowl win over Texas (big plays in the pass game and on special teams) as his fondest memories of VT years. That Sugar Bowl team, as well as the 1996 team that played Nebraska in the Orange Bowl, was quarterbacked by Jim Druckenmiller.
Druck was a big, pro-style QB (6’4”, 241 lbs.) with a strong arm. He was a first round draft pick in 1997, anointed Steve Young’s intended successor in San Francisco, but due to an injury to Young, he was forced to start before he was ready, and his career never took flight. Still, his canon-arm and control of the Buffalo Bills-style no huddle offense allowed Tech to play a much more aggressive brand of football than was the norm under Beamer. And with Ken Oxendine (and Dwayne Thomas in 1995) at running back, the Hokies had the sort of balance necessary to keep defenses honest.
A lot of the talk when Pry took over is that he planned to run a blend of the Joe Moorhead Penn St. offense and the Wisconsin power offense. With some time and distance, I now view that as a modern update to those Druckenmiller offenses.
But the plan flamed out in dramatic fashion. Why? One big reason is that Tech has only fielded one other nationally relevant team (the 2011 squad) led by a pro-style quarterback since the mid-1990s. In that case, the team had four senior offensive lineman, each somewhere between good and very good, an NFL running back in David Wilson, five experienced wide receivers (two of whom would get drafted, and one other, Jarret Boykin, who would go on to have a decent pro career as an undrafted free agent), and, of course, the gifted, if erratic, Logan Thomas at QB.
At 6’6”, 254 lbs., Thomas was, physically speaking, the perfect mix of build and athletic ability. And he could throw the ball through a brick wall. The only problem is that his accuracy was hit or miss, and that became a glaring issue when VT’s wide receiver talent declined precipitously later in Thomas’s career.
Thomas had a great 2011 season, and the future looked bright, but his statistics would only degrade over the following two years. In hindsight, those results should not be surprising. There were talent declines across the board: at WR, but also OL and RB following the 2011 season. Also, and I think most importantly, Thomas was not a true dual threat quarterback. He was fast in a straight line, and obviously built like a tank, but he was neither quick nor elusive. When the o-line couldn’t get to the second level on a QB keeper, and there was no David Wilson to keep the linebackers honest, tacklers could and did rush to fill the lane. Thomas was usually good for some forward push, and while a two-yard gain definitely beats a one-yard loss, it isn’t quite this:
For those of you scoring along at home, Taylor juked an unblocked linebacker and an unblocked safety on his way to that epic 38-yard run on third-and-31. So elusive was Taylor that he was not even really touched for the first 35 yards. God-given ability like that is rare and can make up for a lot of other sins a given football team might have.
And what happens with an elite dual threat QB when a run play is executed just as it was designed? This:
Here, LG Greg Nosal (#75) and LT Andrew Lanier (#72) get a great double-team block on an NC State linebacker, opening a big hole for Taylor. The safety comes in late to fill the hole, and if this were Thomas, he probably would have gotten hit seven yards down field and perhaps fallen forward for a first down. Taylor, however, leaves the safety grasping for air on his way to a 73-yard run.
The point here is that with these elite dual threat quarterbacks, Tech could excel with an average line (and good to great running backs). When the Hokies got a good push up front, big plays flowed freely. When they didn’t, the QB was still able to make something out of nothing at a comparably ridiculous rate.
Tyrod Taylor was a once-in-a-generation talent, except that he kind of wasn’t. In truth, he was the latest in a line of elite, in-state, dual threat QBs to sign with and star at Virginia Tech (recruiting stats are per 247):
Michael Vick (1998), predates the recruiting services, but essentially he was second only to Ronald Curry who went to UNC and underachieved
Brian Randall (2001), 4-star, 0.9679, #102 nationally, #4 dual, #4 in VA
Marcus Vick (2005), 5-star, 0.9910, #22 nationally, #2 dual, #3 in VA, #391 all-time
Tyrod Taylor (2007), 5-star, 0.9914, #17 nationally, #1 dual, #1 in VA, #371 all-time
Can you think of any school in history with so such success in recruiting QBs for so long? Over the course of a decade, which not coincidentally overlapped with the peak-Beamer years, Virginia Tech signed four highly-rated dual threat quarterbacks and trotted them out there, one after the other, year-after-year. Then it all dried up. Sort of.
2008-09 Virginia High School Quarterbacks
The 2008 QB class in the Commonwealth featured a 5-star dual threat (EJ Manual, 0.9849, who signed with Florida St., had a great college career, and became a first round NFL draft pick). That class also included 4-star pro-style QB Mike Glennon (0.9773, signed with NC State, also had a great college career, was a third round pick). Mike was Sean’s brother, and while Sean is a die-hard Hokie, he was stuck between Marcus Vick and Tyrod Taylor. The fan base always pined for those other players and had little patience for watching Sean get sacked over and over. Sean was a good pro-style QB who played behind a bad OL in 2006 and a pretty bad line in 2007. The guy was much more athletic than anyone gave him credit for, but he didn’t have the requisite wiggle and shake to consistently dodge oncoming, often unblocked, rushers. All of this is to say that signing Mike was always an uphill battle, and he wasn’t the best of fits. And, really, why should he or Manual have gone to Tech? It was clear as day that they would have had to sit behind Taylor for three years.
The more important year was 2009. That class included 5-star pro-style Tajh Boyd (0.9840, signed with Clemson, had a great college career, was a 6th round draft pick, hung around the NFL for a couple years and Canada for two more, is now an offensive assistant at Clemson) and 4-star Logan Thomas (.9719, signed with Virginia Tech, had an up and down college career, 4th round draft pick, saw limited time as a QB before switching to tight end, where he currently plays for the Washington Commanders).
Thomas was not a surefire quarterback. He went to Brookville High School, which is about an hour and 40-minute drive from Blacksburg, and was basically a man in a boy’s league (Brookville is a Division 2 Class 3 school). ESPN listed him as an athlete, but their scouting report said he had the skills to play QB in college and compared him to Ohio State’s Terrelle Pryor. In contrast, 247 listed him as a dual threat. Collegefootballdata.com lists him as a pro-style QB.
Tech was generally getting an elite QB every two or three years, and the 2009 class was far better than the 2010 class. So, the choice was Thomas or Boyd. Boyd was the surer thing as a QB, but he was a pro-style quarterback coming off a torn ACL, and pro-style QBs at Virginia Tech had a much lower hit rate than dual threats. Thomas was built like a Greek god, was much more athletic than Boyd, went to school closer to Tech (Boyd went to Phoebus in Hampton), and had the added benefit of a backup plan. If he didn’t succeed at QB, Tech could always move him to TE. In that way, he was essentially a guaranteed success. At Clemson, there were a few questions around Boyd (mainly around his knee), but at Tech, there would have been more.
Logan Thomas committed to VT on November 6, 2008. Tajh Boyd committed to Clemson on January 17, 2009. For what it’s worth, I think Tech made the right call. The problem is what came next. Nothing.
The Extinction Event(s)
Frank Beamer overhauled his offensive staff prior to the 2013 season. In the lead up to these changes, Beamer had to make a decision - what kind of offense should Tech run? The fanbase was clamoring for a high flying spread attack, but Beamer, rightly, noted that the teams who ran that system were not the teams who were winning National Championships. That came later. Beamer looked at Alabama and Stamford, both of which ran pro-style offenses, and saw teams that won at the highest levels of football. Virginia also had not produced a true 4- or 5-star dual threat QB since 2008. Thus, Beamer pursued Pep Hamilton (Stanford’s offensive coordinator), who chose the NFL instead, and ultimately settled on Scot Loeffler, the former QB coach at Florida (for Tim Tebow) and Auburn. Loeffler is currently the Head Coach at Bowling Green.
To the untrained eye, Loeffler’s offense didn’t look that different from the Bryan Stinespring/Mike O’Cain offense it replaced. But underneath the hood it was very different. It was more complex in its route concepts. Too complex for a tweener.
Virginia’s dual threats did not go extinct overnight. The Hokies signed 4-star dual threat Bucky Hodges (0.9049, #10 dual nationally, #13 in the state, #257 nationally) in the 2013 class and 4-star Travon McMillian (0.8921, #8 dual, #10 in the state, #317 nationally) in the 2014 class. However, both had asterisks, as neither was a no doubt QB in college. Indeed, both played as RS-Freshmen, Hodges at TE and McMillian at RB, and both enjoyed great success in their time playing positions other than quarterback for Loeffler.
Since 2015, the Commonwealth has produced one 4-star quarterback, Jalon Jones, a dual threat in the class of 2019, who signed with Florida. He lasted one semester in Gainesville, then transferred to Jackson St., where he got consistent snaps the following year. From there he moved on to Bethune Cookman.
In fact, looking at the list of all QBs from the commonwealth since 2015, I recognize only one name: 2-star pro-style Jason Brown, who was a backup for the Hokies in 2022.
Justin Fuente and the Search for an Elite Dual Threat
Justin Fuente made his fair share of mistakes during his time in Blacksburg, but, for the record, I remain an admirer of his. He ran a clean program and he understood what it took to win at Tech. He just couldn’t pull it off, and while some of that is on him, plenty of it is on external circumstances (Covid, facilities, and athletic department fundraising chief among them).
Fuente brought in an excellent dual threat transfer (Jerod Evans) in 2016, and signed 4-star Hendon Hooker (dual threat, 0.8903) out of North Carolina in 2017. Fuente’s instincts were right, and he inked two guys in his first two years that he could build the program around. While 2018 was no doubt a down year, things turned around in 2019, and the 2020 offense was loaded. Josh Jackson and Ryan Willis were an effective enough bridge to Hooker, and things were primed to take off.
Then Covid happened. Hendon got sick prior to the season and, when he saw his first action during the North Carolina game, he was noticeably skinnier. But he was electric! However, very quickly he got nicked up. Then came the Clemson game, the fumble, and the visible shaking on the sideline. Talk about an impossible situation.
Braxton Burmeister was cut from the same mold as the earlier dual threats, between 6’0” and 6’1”, speedy and quick, but with less arm talent. Fuente got him to perform at a serviceable level, but he was hurt all the time (mad kudos, though, for playing through so much pain). We also shouldn’t forget Quincy Patterson, who was cut from the Logan Thomas mold. He came in raw, and through multiple stops in college, never really developed as a passer, but he was the right type of recruit: great character, intelligent as the day is long, and all the physical tools that one could hope for.
So, let me ask you this. What do all of Fuente’s QBs have in common? The transfers and high school recruits? The dual threats and pro-styles?
Every single one of them was from out-of-state. Was that because Fuente and his staff did a lousy job of building relationships with high school coaches in Virginia? No. It’s because they have eyes and weren’t blind. The Commonwealth of Virginia did not produce one starting caliber quarterback, pro-style or dual threat, during Fuente’s entire tenure. Maybe it rubbed some high school coaches the wrong way that Fuente focused less effort on in-state recruiting than Beamer had, but the times had changed and, especially at the quarterback position, there was no talent to recruit.
Correlation is Not Causation, but…
There is a strong, but not overwhelming, correlation between Tech having an elite dual threat starting at quarterback and annual win totals. Among starting QBs since 1999, this type displayed the highest correlation in single regression tests:
Elite QBs included: Michael Vick, Bryan Randall, Marcus Vick, Tyrod Taylor, and Logan Thomas. All of them except Thomas were classified as dual threats. The Excellent classifications included all the elite QBs plus the remaining 4-stars: Sean Glennon (pro-style), Jerod Evans (dual threat), Hendon Hooker (dual threat), and Braxton Burmeister (dual threat). The 2007 team is credited as having both a dual threat starter (Taylor) and pro-style starter (Glennon) at quarterback.
There is not sufficient data available to get a real read on 4-star and up pro-style success, but among dual threats, the correlations are quite clear, and they rise with QB recruiting ratings. So, although Pry watched pro-style QB Jim Druckenmiller succeed spectacularly at Tech, the historical record shows that dual threats correlate with Hokie wins, and the better the dual threat, the tighter the correlation.
Takeaways
So, where does this all leave us. Well,
VHSL is no longer producing elite QBs, dual threat or otherwise
Elite in-state dual threats were basically a sure thing at VT - no busts
There is a strong statistical correlation between 10-win VT seasons and having an elite dual threat QB
Pro-style QBs succeed at Tech at a much lower rate than dual threats (2 out of 7 since 2002)
Tech can recruit very good dual threats from out of state, but has never landed an elite dual-threat recruit from outside the Commonwealth (Evans was a transfer mid-level 4-star, and Hooker and Burmeister were low-level 4-stars)
Since 2002, Tech has signed a plurality of the 4- and 5-star offensive lineman from Virginia, but not nearly enough to produce a consistently elite, or even very good, offensive line
That brings us to Kyron Drones and the change in offensive philosophy. Tech’s offense has traditionally required an elite dual threat QB to be nationally relevant, and evidence suggests that is due (at least in part) to insufficient numbers of high level offensive linemen coming from the VHSL ranks. Elite, in-state, dual threat quarterbacks went the way of the dinosaurs more than 10 years ago, and, not surprisingly, Virginia Tech has struggled to win consistently ever since.
Recent data suggest that a dual threat of Drones’s caliber (4-star, 0.9087), used correctly, should be good for between 6 and 10 wins. However, the difference in wiggle and elusiveness between Drones and incumbent starter Grant Wells is not nearly as great as the difference between Tyrod Taylor and Sean Glennon. So, while bringing Drones in is a decided step in the right direction, don’t assume he’s going to win the starting job in 2023. And please, do no expect him to be the savior who is going return Virginia Tech to the top tier of college football. I would love it if he could pull that off, but there is no quantitative evidence to suggest that he is capable of overcoming all of Virginia Tech’s other faults as a football team.