Risk Management in Recruiting

Decreased variance in VT high school recruiting ratings has coincided with declines in on field performance. Why, and what does that portend for the Class of 2023?

A couple weeks ago, I published an article featuring a quantitative analysis that demonstrated Virginia Tech’s dependence on elite, dual threat quarterbacks.

Then, last week, I looked at where the Hokies might go, position-wise, in order to make up for the drop off in quarterback recruits.

Today’s article considers Virginia Tech’s 2023 high school recruiting class in context with past classes. In particular, an interesting trend has emerged that potentially connects development (strength and conditioning) with NIL and talent evaluation.

The 2023 Class in Context

At first blush, the 2023 class looks ok. Here are my top-line observations:

• I doubt either QB ever starts (unless due to injury) at Virginia Tech. Watson could start somewhere before it’s all said and done, but he likely will not be ready until at least his 3rd year, and more likely his 4th or 5th.

• Don’t expect many of these guys to play much next year.

• Overall, this is a high floor, low ceiling kind of class. Development is likely the key factor that will determine its success.

Under Justin Fuente the Hokies began to transition away from taking a bunch of low rated, project type players - the types who, if they succeed, are considered diamonds in the rough. I would guess that the reasons are such:

1. Fuente’s staff was good at evaluating fit within their schemes, but not as good as Beamer’s peak staffs at pure talent evaluation, or projection from high school to college.

2. The internet and camp circuit have given college coaches and staff much greater ability to evaluate players at scale.

3. Fuente inherited some great players and a lot of sub-par players. He and his staff may have made a concerted effort to elevate the talent floor on the team in an effort to improve competition at practice and have a broader pool of players who they would actually trust in a game.

To demonstrate, I took the ratings from the repository at collegefootballdata.com and assigned baseline values of expected peak performance. Those definitions are as follows:

For context, I ran the data for the 2023 class in comparison to three prior classes:

• 2007 - (Peak Beamer), the Tyrod Taylor/Darren Evans class

• 2014 - (Late Beamer), the Isaiah Ford/Cam Phillips class

• 2018 - (Peak Fuente), the Dax Hollifield/Tre Turner class

Here are the numbers for the recruits coming out of high school:

Notice the big shift in the number of Project/Specialists from the Beamer years to the Fuente/Pry years. Beamer took an average of 8.5, or roughly one-third of such players in each class. Fuente and Pry took an average of 1.5. And the vast majority of these players were low ranked position players, not specialists (kickers or long snappers).

Risk/Reward and Recruiting Philosophies

Does a smattering of high ceiling, high floor recruits change a staff’s overall risk tolerance?

Interestingly, Beamer & Co. hit on a fair amount of the developmental recruits while missing on the guys who projected to be starters later in their careers. Examples of hits who everyone has heard of include Danny Coale (2007) as well as Greg Stroman and Terrell Edmunds (2014). There were also developmental guys who went on to have nice careers that few will remember, guys like:

• Andrew Lanier, a converted TE who started at LT as an upperclassman (2007)

• Greg Nosal, another converted TE who started at LG next to Lanier as an upperclassman (2007)

• Alonzo Tweedy, a speedy, undersized whip linebacker who played a big role in the 2011 Miami game and the Sugar Bowl at the end of that season (2007)

The players listed above were a major reason why those two classes outperformed the expectations set by individual recruiting ratings. Conversely, the lack of diamonds in the rough was a major factor behind the underperformance of the 2018 class. To demonstrate the impact of the high risk/high reward Beamer classes vs. the low risk Fuente class of 2018, I assigned each player a performance number that compared that player’s actual achievement on the field to his expected ceiling coming out of high school. For example, a player expected to eventually become a 1st Team All Conference player who actually became an All American, would merit a “1” because that player performed at a level one tier above expectations. Conversely, if that player had peaked at an Honorable Mention All Conference level, he would have merited a “-4”. Any player who completely flamed out or never made it to campus was assigned a Project/Specialist performance level.

Overall, the Beamer classes outperformed expectations, while Fuente’s underperformed. Ok, you say, but Fuente’s class had a higher floor, so more was expected. Was the actual on-field performance any different?

Yes, it was. In raw numbers, the Beamer classes had as many Project/Specialist performers as it did recruits (17), while Fuente’s had twice as many (4 vs. 2). And at the other end of the spectrum, Beamer’s 2007 class had one projected player above Honorable Mention All Conference (Taylor), yet produced four. The 2014 results were even better - six to end players produced vs. zero expected. Fuente’s 2018 class was a direct match - two expected and two produced.

The middle of Fuente’s 2018 class was much stronger than either of Beamer’s. Among the supporting cast - guys who play, but are not stars (Contributor to Honorable Mention All Conference), here is the numerical breakdown:

• 2007 - 8 players

• 2014 - 9 players

• 2018 - 14 players

Now think back to what we actually saw on the field. It lines up nicely. The 2007 class featured a lot of guys who power the BCS teams of 2010 and 2011. The 2014 class produced players who would lead the charge in Fuente’s first two years (2016 and 2017), during which the team won 19 games.

Of course, we all used to cringe at how the Curt Newsome era offensive lines performed against top competition, but then one of the stud players would connect with a diamond in the rough or converted high school running back to make magic:

The Takeaway

Avoiding busts is good, and in theory, if the Hokies have implemented a strong developmental program under Brent Pry, then starting from a higher floor, or baseline in terms of the class as a hole, is ideal. The problem, as I see it, is two-fold.

First, the 2023 class lacks top-end talent. There are now six scholarship quarterbacks on the roster, and based on ratings and historical data, Tech has a realistic shot at winning eight games with only one of them - Kyron Drones, a transfer. Tech hasn’t recruited an elite running back in more than a decade, and it shows. Wide receiver recruiting has improved, but not enough to compensate for the declines at the other skill positions.

Second, whether development has dropped off at Tech or evened out across all major programs, or recruiting ratings have improved over the years, I worry about the lack of upward mobility among recruits since Beamer retired. We’re just not seeing big jumps much any more. A middling recruit becomes a middling player. We’re not seeing guys like Jaymes Brooks, a projected contributor from the class of 2007 who ended up becoming a 2nd Team All Conference performer on the offensive line.

And taking those two points into account, that means we could be in for some average to bad football in the years to come. Unless, that is, the entire recruiting model in Blacksburg has changed. Maybe Tech doesn’t recruit low ranked players any more because rather than have them eat a scholarship for a few years while providing comparatively little in the way of practice competition, they let those players go to G5 or FCS schools, wait for the cream to rise to the top, then pursue the best performers in the transfer portal. It’s a fascinating notion, but one that will have to wait for a future article.