The team definitely has personnel holes - notably along the offensive line and at linebacker - but it had similar holes in previous years and lacked the depth we have seen this year, yet still managed to win six regular season games.

In 2025, the second stringers have played nearly to the level of the starters, which would be great were it not for the fact that the starters have been horrible.

Changing the offensive and defensive schemes entering year four was far from ideal, but with so many incoming transfers it boggles the mind that the team couldn’t find players who fit the new schemes, especially on defense.

In short, I don’t think this Virginia Tech team is as bad as they have played lately. Rather, I think the version that played the first half against Vanderbilt is probably the closest we have seen thus far of median 2025 Virginia Tech,

Offense

It all went south for the Hokies when left tackle Johnny Garrett exited the Vanderbilt game with an injury. His absence, along with that of right guard Montavious Cunningham, has forced a host of young linemen to play before they are ready.

And yet, Garrett was not having a good year. His PFF grade was an atrocious 52.8. Cunningham was worse at 46.9.

So how did replacing bad linemen with young bad linemen completely tank the Hokies’ season?

It didn’t.

The team couldn’t pass block before the injuries, and it has gotten marginally worse with all the freshmen playing up front.

The big change came in the run/pass ratio. At a high level, though, it’s difficult to detect a major shift:

1. vs. South Carolina: 37 runs, 35 passes (51% run)

2. vs. Vanderbilt: 31 runs, 29 passes (52% run)

3. vs. Old Dominion: 34 runs, 39 passes (47% run)

However, sacks and scrambles go down on the stat sheet as runs, so let’s look at drop backs for Kyron Drones:

1. vs. South Carolina: 41 drop backs out of 72 plays (57% pass plays)

2. vs. Vanderbilt: 36 drop backs out of 60 plays (60% pass plays)

3. vs. Old Dominion: 53 drop backs out of 73 plays (73% pass plays)

As a play caller, Philip Montgomery appears to favor a roughly 50/50 share of rushing calls to passing calls when the game is close. Once the game gets out of hand and the Hokies find themselves down by more than one score, he has to throw a lot more. Consider the following count of minutes during which the Hokies have been leading or within one score:

1. vs. South Carolina: leading or within one score for 48 minutes (3.2 quarters)

2. vs. Vanderbilt: leading or within one score for 50 minutes (3.3 quarters)

3. vs. Old Dominion: leading or within one score for 17.5 minutes (1.2 quarters)

True to form, Montgomery has not asked Drones to keep the ball on designed QB carries more than 9 times in a game this year.

The running backs have had their moments, but the scoreboard has rendered them non-entities for 36% of the season - the amount of game time during which the Hokies have trailed by more than one touchdown.

Don’t get me wrong, the Tech offense is not good. But we knew it wouldn’t be good - not with so little experience up front.

The fixable problem lies on the other side of the ball.

Defense

Raise your hand if you had the secondary pegged before the season as the biggest trouble spot on the team.

Yeah, I don’t think anyone saw that coming.

Through the first three games of the season, the Virginia Tech defense as a whole has a 42.9 coverage grade and has allowed opposing quarterbacks to complete 71.2% of their passes.

As bad as the offensive line has been, both pass blocking and run blocking have graded out above 50.

Only four players with at least 20 coverage snaps have graded out above 60:

• Quentin Reddish (S) - 77.4

• Isaiah Brown-Murray (CB) - 64.3

• Christian Ellis (NB) - 62.1

• Thomas Williams (CB) - 61.2

Caleb Brown (41.7) and the recently departed Dante Lovett (44.8) saw their snaps drastically reduced because of their struggles.

That would be the case with other players too if their backups were not equally bad against the pass.

Unfortunately, there have been no good options at linebacker, nickel, or safety, where every player in the rotation has been atrocious in coverage.

Take linebacker, for instance. Caleb Woodson. His coverage grade is 53.2, and he has allowed 5 completions on 6 attempts.

The Jaden Keller/Michael Short combination has been even worse. Both have coverage grades below 50, and combined they have allowed 8 completions in 9 attempts.

Is it a Sam Siefkes thing? Nope.

Woodson (50.6) and Keller (53.6) were terrible in coverage last year, too.

Short had a better grade last year at North Carolina (71.1), but most of that came against Boston College and UConn late in the season, and he still allowed two catches on three targets overall.

Can anything be done?

Brent Pry was fired because he wasn’t able to elevate recruiting.

The main reason he failed to improve the talent level was that Virginia Tech’s poor football operation (management structure) could not compete against peer programs.

That is how the Hokies ended up with a roster full of G5 and FCS transfers. Tech looked big time compared to where they came from.

Now we’re seeing that for many of those players, the adjustment to P4 football is not immediate.

In order to post a respectable showing the rest of the way, Sam Siefkes needs to fix the coverage problems in the secondary.

At least in theory, those players, who had had some success before transferring to Virginia Tech, are capable of adjusting to the speed of the game at the P4 level and showing improved play as the season progresses.

The first step to winning games is getting stops on third and long, and there is no time like the present to make strides in that direction.

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Since then, the team has gone through spring practice, and another round of transfers in and out has taken place.

With the 2025 roster set, now is an appropriate time to drill down and try to quantify the level at which we should expect the new players to perform.

This article will focus only on starting caliber players. I identified seven such players in March, and to that total I will add Kody Huisman, a senior defensive tackle from North Dakota St.

Isaiah Spence, a wide receiver from Jacksonville St. is close, but he is probably a year away.

This analysis looks at PFF grades from the 2024 season and projects the grade range for each of the potential starters. Those projections are then compared with last year’s starters to determine whether or not the Hokies can expect an upgrade at the position.

Baseline figures

For a baseline range of expected performance, I looked at Hokie transfers in from G5 or FCS schools who started or played starter-level snaps during the Brent Pry era.

This is a pretty small group, comprising:

• Da’Quan Felton (FCS)

• Jaylin Lane (G5)

• Sam Brumfield (G5)

• Bhayshul Tuten (FCS)

• Derrick Canteen (G5)

This sample size, although tiny, nonetheless reveals that the step up from FCS competition is massive compared to G5.

The two players who came from FCS teams saw their PFF grades decrease by 11.0 (Felton) and 17.2 points (Tuten) in their first year at Virginia Tech. Tuten’s grade increased 4.7 points year-over-year in 2024, while Felton’s declined another 8.0 points.

Meanwhile, the two players who came from G5 teams and started at the same position saw PFF grade deltas of +0.2 (Brumfield) and -1.5 (Lane). In short, if they improved a bit in their first season with the Hokies, then the increased talent of the opposition resulted in basically no net change to their PFF grades.

Derrick Canteen is a unique case because he didn’t start at Tech, but he played starter level snaps. He also played (primarily, although not exclusively) out of position at nickel.

Canteen’s grade declined by 9.3 points from his pre-Hokies season. Canteen elected to transfer again following the 2023 season. He landed at Cincinnati, where he again played nickel and notched starter level snaps. His PFF grade rebounded, ending up +2.7 points over his final G5 season, suggesting the position change was the primary reason for his grade decline in 2023.

Overall, that leaves us with the following ranges:

• G5: -3 to +3 (Canteen’s 2024 numbers and a slight adjustment for the 2023 time he spent at cornerback) for players who play the same position and -9 to 0 for those who switch positions

• FCS: -17 to -11

2025 expectations

Arias Nash and Kody Huisman come to Blacksburg from FCS programs. All the others played at G5 schools last year.

Right now, the expectation is that James Djonkam will switch from middle linebacker to edge, so his projected grades were penalized.

Isaiah Brown-Murray worked mostly at nickel during the spring, but his positional status is more up in the air. I would expect him to defend both in the slot and out wide (where he played last year), with the snap split dependent on the health and performance of the other cornerbacks.

Positional performance deltas

The theme among individual defenders in 2025 is lower ceiling, but higher floor. Inconsistent play doomed the 2024 Hokies to mediocrity. The incoming group of starting-caliber transfers appears set to resolve that issue.

Defensive Tackle

The Hokies will almost surely take a step back at defensive tackle, where they lose Aeneas Peebles (89.1) and Wilfried Pene (70.0). Huisman and Nash will likely grade out in the Pene neighborhood, around 70, give or take a few points.

The Hokies could potentially be as effective in the interior of the defensive line as they were last year if Kemari Copeland returns from injury and plays at a similar level, which is where he was (68.0) before he got hurt.

Kelvin Gilliam is coming off a strong first season in Blacksburg (69.5), so it is reasonable to expect the Hokies to go four deep this year at DT without any noticeable drop-off.

Last year’s fourth defensive tackle, Josh Fuga, graded out a notch lower at 61.6 than the other three tackles. Fuga was a bigger player who wasn’t a great fit for the Brent Pry system. The top four defensive tackles this season all appear to be good schematic fits.

Edge

Out on the edge, the Hokies will be replacing Antwaun Powell-Ryland (78.6) and Cole Nelson (63.7).

Here, the combination of Ben Bell and James Djonkam should be an upgrade, even if together they fail total less sacks than APR got last year.

The performance gap between APR and Nelson was not ideal, as it enabled opposing teams to scheme against APR. This combo also struggled to hold the edge against the run, with both grading out in the mid-60s on rush defense.

All indications are that the 2025 edge combo will be more balanced - strong against both the pass and the run.

Cornerback

Dante Lovett will be the #1 cornerback, so with Isaiah Brown-Murray the question is whether he will be #2 and play out wide or #3 and play against the slot receiver.

Reports out of spring practice are that he played mostly at nickel, but I suspect he’ll get a longer look outside in August, given the Hokies’ current crop of corners and their relative health.

At best, he can be expected to perform at roughly Mansoor Delane’s 2024 level out wide. In the slot, he might match the level of play from the 2024 nickels, which featured a rotating cast of characters, but a moderate decline is more likely.

Safety

The Cash-Ellis-Flowers combo at safety looks like a massive upgrade over Jaylen Jones (65.2) and Mose Phillips (58.5).

The three new safeties should all grade out in the low 70s, which from a delta perspective is so much better than 2024 that it alone might be the difference between a win and a loss.

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We know Tech was extremely thin at that position last year, but it is still unclear how much depth the team really added from the portal.

Will new defensive coordinator Sam Siefkes employ a defense with three high safeties? How many of these guys will move to what was previously called the whip or Sam linebacker position? Does that position even exist anymore?

Who knows?

Some of those details will probably trickle out in interviews, but I suspect Tech’s coaches will try to keep as much of that information secret as possible.

Make no mistake, beating Shane Beamer and South Carolina is very, very important for this coaching staff.

Following up on a recent article examining the portal gains and losses on offense, in this article I will turn to the defense and what is knowable at this point - how the Hokies fared in the aggregate.

Did Virginia Tech emerge from the winter portal period better than it was in the hours before the portal opened?

Read on to find out.

Methodology

The methodology is the same that I used to evaluate the offense.

I created a dataset comprised of each scholarship addition and subtraction from the portal with the following measures:

• 247Sports high school rating

• 247Sports transfer portal rating

• On3 transfer portal rating

• 2024 PFF grade

• 2024 offense/defense snap count (PFF), converted to snap score

The top four measures in the list have as their max a rating or grade of 100. To normalize the snap count, I calculated a snap count rating for each player with 1,000 snaps set as the max. It worked out roughly like PFF grades. Christian Ellis had the highest snap score at 90.0.

I then looked at the average score and the total score (max of 500, although, some players lacked certain pieces of data, e.g., those from DII schools).

This analysis is as much art as it is science, since recruiting ratings are much likelier to be high numbers than PFF grades and snap counts, so missing data can really throw off the projections.

My reading is that players lacking data in one or more fields are simply less “known” quantities, so we should take a wider confidence interval approach with them.

Finally, informed by their quantitative scores, but without observing hard cutoffs, I assigned each player to one of four groups for the 2025 season:

1. Starter with NFL potential (4 points)

2. Starter (3)

3. Contributor (2)

4. Depth (1)

Obviously, each player is only a breakout spring or summer camp away from becoming a starter or starter with pro potential, but based on the information we have now, this analysis quantifies the portal’s impact on Virginia Tech’s defense.

Player groups

Although the Hokies have in the past rotated a lot of defenders onto the field, the amount of playing time incoming transfers saw at their previous stop remains an excellent proxy for the likelihood that they will play a lot at Virginia Tech.

Starters with NFL potential (net: +4 points)

The Hokies lost one starter who will have a chance to play in the NFL, but gained two in return. The newcomers in this group, Isaiah Cash and Christian Ellis, both have higher average ratings than the one departing player, Mansoor Delane.

While it would have been nice to retain Delane, many expected him to declare for the NFL Draft after last season. Losing him to LSU via the portal is not that different. He’s gone, the Hokies are unlikely to play against his new team (Delane would probably only participate in the playoff; he would probably opt out of a bowl), and in the end, it was a business decision.

For the past two seasons Delane was the #2 cornerback behind Dorian Strong. Had he returned to Tech for the 2025 season, he would not have been guaranteed prime billing at his position, as Dante Lovett looks every bit his equal.

In addition, Cash and Ellis are both safeties, a position where the Hokies struggled mightily the past two seasons. As a result, the net impact of these moves could be an underestimate.

Starters (net: +12 points)

The Hokies brought in five starting caliber players and only lost one. And I’m being conservative with this grouping.

The 2024 PFF grade range for the incoming players was 71.0 to 85.7. The only player in this group who left the program is Mose Phillips, and he earned a grade of 58.3, which is 1.7 points below baseline.

The only demerit here is that the additions are all along the defensive line or in the secondary. The Hokies really would have benefitted from adding a surefire starter to the linebacking corps.

Contributors (net: -4 points)

The Hokies saw a couple of contributors - Sam Brumfield and Keli Lawson - depart. They did not acquire any players of this caliber.

Brumfield was consistent, but limited. Reading the tea leaves on his playing time and PFF grades, I posited during the season that at some point he got hurt, and since 2024 was thought to be his last season of eligibility, the coaching staff decided to go with Jaden Keller the rest of the way.

Once Brumfield was healthy enough to play significant snaps, he split time with Keller, but was only getting about one out of every three snaps at middle linebacker. That he nonetheless ended the season with a much higher grade than Keller was frustrating, but hopefully Keller is the better for it this season.

Brumfield received an extra year of eligibility due to the Diego Pavia court decision. He was never in Tech’s 2025 plan, so he only makes this list on a technicality.

Keli Lawson’s status is currently in limbo. He decommitted from UCF two months ago, but does not appear to have landed anywhere else.

It is very unlikely that Lawson would return to the Tech football team in 2025, but at this point it is not entirely impossible. For the purposes of this analysis, I assumed that he will not.

Depth (net: -2 points)

Tech shed a number of players who had no chance at playing meaningful snaps, while acquiring a couple projects and a couple players who had been highly-rated recruits coming out of high school.

Sherrod Covil could very well contribute this season, but based on his recent history, I do not believe that should be the expectation.

Likewise, Jordan Bass could make an impact if there are injuries at his linebacking position, but he has already gotten in some legal trouble, and it is not like he was tearing it up at Pitt.

Offense overall (net: +10 points)

Although many of the defenders who joined the Hokies out of the portal were unfamiliar to Tech fans prior to their respective commitments, as this analysis demonstrates, they are, as a group, much better than the departed players.

The Hokies still have issues at linebacker, but otherwise, this group of portal enrollees checks a lot of boxes.

That said, the task was arguably taller on defense, with the Hokies losing a lot of their best players due to graduation.

Overall, Virginia Tech netted out positive in the transfer portal on both sides of the ball. The next step is to determine the net effect of all roster changes, including departures due to graduation.

With that information, we will be able to more accurately set expectations for the coaches, and for the overall win-loss record.

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The returning players, many of whom were backups last year, are inexperienced. At the same time, many have higher ceilings than did the players they are replacing.

There is also an influx of transfers coming in. Nearly all of them play along the offensive line or at running back, the two positions with the most acute needs.

In this article, I will quantify the portal gains and losses in an attempt to answer one simple question: Did Virginia Tech emerge from the winter portal period better than it was in the hours the portal opened.

Methodology

I created a dataset comprised of each scholarship addition and subtraction from the portal with the following measures:

• 247Sports high school rating

• 247Sports transfer portal rating

• On3 transfer portal rating

• 2024 PFF grade

• 2024 offense/defense snap count (PFF), converted to snap score

The top four measures in the list have as their max a rating or grade of 100. To normalize the snap count, I calculated a snap count rating for each player with 1,000 snaps set as the max. It worked out roughly like PFF grades. Tomas Rimac had the highest snap score at 93.7.

I then looked at the average score and the total score (max of 500, although, some players lacked certain pieces of data, e.g., those from DII schools).

This analysis is as much art as it is science, since recruiting ratings are much likelier to be high numbers than PFF grades and snap counts, so missing data can really throw off the projections.

My reading is that players lacking data in one or more fields are simply less “known” quantities, so we should take a wider confidence interval approach with them.

Finally, informed by their quantitative scores, but without observing hard cutoffs, I assigned each player to one of four groups for the 2025 season:

1. Starter with NFL potential (4 points)

2. Starter (3)

3. Contributor (2)

4. Depth (1)

Obviously, each player is only a breakout spring or summer camp away from becoming a starter or starter with pro potential, but based on the information we have now, this analysis represents the portal’s impact on Virginia Tech’s offense.

Player groups

One very important consideration is snap count. At this stage, before any of the incoming players have hit the practice field in maroon and orange, the amount of playing time they saw at their previous stop weighs heavily on the likelihood that they will play a lot at Virginia Tech. This is especially the case with the running backs.

Starters with NFL potential (net: even)

The Hokies lost one starter who will have a chance to play in the NFL in Xavier Chaplin. In return, they gained Tomas Rimac, the highest rated overall transfer either coming to or departing from Tech.

I nearly included Braelin Moore in this group, but his 2024 PFF grade (67.5) is not NFL worthy, and his high transfer portal rating reflects high demand and low supply, rather than elite talent on Moore’s part.

Starters (net: even)

Again, at the starting caliber level, the Hokies made a one-for-one trade. Braelin Moore is headed to LSU and Braydon Bennett is coming to Tech from Coastal Carolina.

Bennett seems like an under-the-radar guy. Terion Stewart got most of the press directed toward the running back enrollees, and while Stewart is a powerful back, he is really a one trick pony. He excels at breaking tackles, but that’s about it.

Bennett, meanwhile, has plenty of size at 6’2”, 215 lbs., and he is a better receiver and blocker than Stewart, which is probably why he played nearly 200 more snaps than Stewart did last year.

Reading between the lines on PFF, I suspect Stewart is also more injury prone, which would not be a surprise given the physicality with which he runs.

Contributors (net: +6 points)

Here is where the Hokies made their move in the portal, adding four players who are positioned to be regular contributors to the offense, while only losing one (Malachi Thomas).

Cameron Seldon was a highly rated recruit coming out of high school, and he would stand to gain possibly more than any other player from a Taylor hire at OC due to his positional flexibility.

The aforementioned Terion Stewart should see a lot of action on third-and-short and in goal line formations. Bennett’s late addition to the class will take pressure off Stewart, allowing him to be used in ideal situations and limiting any pressure that might come to overuse him.

Donovan Greene battled injuries at Wake Forest, but he was a four-star receiver coming out of high school and he performed well when he was on the field. As the elder statesmen in an otherwise very young wide receiver room, he has the opportunity to both put up numbers and mentor the younger guys, many of whom were also four-star recruits.

The final acquisition in this group is Kyle Altuner, a lineman who redshirted at West Virginia last season. He is probably a year away from starting, but he was a highly-rated recruit both out of high school and the portal. He could potentially be a three-year starter at Tech.

Depth (net: -3 points)

Essentially, on a net level, the Hokies traded three depth pieces for three contributor pieces.

Overall, five Hokies who had been passed on the depth chart and were unlikely to see any meaningful action in 2025 transferred out of the program.

Two players who will likely be depth pieces this year, Lucas Austin, a lineman from West Virginia, and Marcellous Hawkins, a running back from DII Central Missouri, are unlikely to break into the two deep at their respective positions.

Offense overall (net: +3 points)

This analysis finds that the Hokies emerged from the winter portal window with, on balance, an improved offense.

That does not mean that the offense will be better in 2025 than it was this past season. There are many other pieces (returning players, offensive coordinator, strength of opponent, etc.) that will factor into the product we see on the field.

The running back room is much stronger and deeper. The wide receiver additions are also high-end talents who could both prove sneaky good additions.

On the negative side, Tech emerged with one less starter on the offensive line, where two other starters exhausted their eligibility this past year. Whichever combination emerges up front, numerically, it is almost guaranteed the 2025 starting offensive line will be more talented but less experienced than this past year’s unit.

If Matt Moore can coach that unit up, the new offensive coordinator will have more playmakers at the skill positions in 2025. It is conceivable that all the starting backs and receivers could have higher PFF grades in 2025 than the starters at those positions did in 2024.

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In the aggregate, the combination of SP+ and advanced metrics that are highlighted on the above report card reveal a 2024 Virginia Tech team that was heads and tails better than the 2023.

(Yes, the season is technically not over until after the bowl game has been played, but the team as we know it no longer exists, and it is important to measure how that team performed, not just the “2024 Virginia Tech Hokies”.)

The overall SP+ percentile improved from 66th last year to 81st this year.

The gains on offense were huge. Tech improved from the 54th percentile to the 73rd. There was less progress on defense, but Tech still improved from the 69th percentile to the 78th percentile.

So, how then did the Hokies end up with the same 6-6 record that they did last year?

Near as I can tell there were two key differences: strength of schedule and a move to the extremes in the advanced metrics.

Strength of schedule

With how quickly rosters turn over, and how dispersed talent is across the FBS, it has become a fool’s errand to evaluate a team’s strength of schedule before the season.

What looked like another soft list of opponents proved more difficult than imagined.

The difficulty of Tech’s schedule is somewhat reflected in the team’s final SP+ ranking of 26th in the nation.

According to SP+, the Hokies played only four teams ranked in the top 50. Miami and Clemson were the only two opponents to finish the season (before the playoff) in the SP+ top 25.

However, the Hokies played three teams that won 10 games (Clemson, Miami, and Marshall) and two more that won 9 (Duke and Syracuse). Here is how Tech performed in those games:

• #10 Miami - lost on a Hail Mary reception that was overturned by replay

• #15 Clemson - lost by 10 (Drones and Tuten both injured and very limited)

• #40 Duke - lost by 3 (Drones injured, DNP; Schlee injured in the 1st quarter)

• #49 Syracuse - lost by 7 in OT (Drones and Tuten injured, DNP)

• #68 Marshall - won by 17

Tech’s two losses to teams outside of the top 50 came to #53 Rutgers by 3 (still an inexplicably bad performance) and #58 Vanderbilt by 7 in OT (on the road, where Alabama also lost).

Five out of Tech’s six loses came by one score or less, and two were in overtime.

Despite the team’s flaws, the difference between six and nine wins in 2024 boiled down to a Charlotte replay and Kyron Drones getting hurt.

When Brent Pry said the Hokies are (now were) close, he was not kidding.

All or nothing

Out of the four quadrants of four metrics each shown on the report card, the Hokies finished in the top 25 nationally in 2024 in five areas:

1. Defensive Passing Play DB Havoc (#18)

2. Defensive Rushing Play Explosiveness (#19)

3. Defensive Passing Play Success (#21)

4. Defensive Rushing Play Front 7 Havoc (#21)

5. Offensive Rushing Play Explosiveness (#24)

The problem is that the Hokies also finished outside of the top 100 in four areas. Two of them are clearly related to the quarterback injuries, while the other two point to performance issues:

1. Offensive Passing Play EPA (#102)

2. Offensive Passing Play Success (#103)

3. Defensive Passing Play Explosiveness (#118)

4. Offensive Rushing Play Front 7 Havoc (#122)

All four of these metrics highlight drive killing (or extending, when Tech was on defense) mistakes. As a result, we can safely say that Tech played winning football on the majority of its plays in 2024, but ended up losing games due to hideous breakdowns on a minority of plays.

In contrast, the 2023 Hokies finished in the top 25 on four metrics and outside of the top 100 on two. The winning to losing plays ratio was much more evenly balanced.

Transfer portal departures

While the list of players leaving the program is old news, and many have indeed found new homes (many, not coincidentally, in the SEC), it takes time for 247Sports to post their transfer portal rankings.

Now that the numbers are in for Tech’s top portal departures, we can evaluate the decision to let these players go.

Outside of Jalen Stroman, who probably just needs a fresh start after a career filled with injuries, the Hokies likely could have kept every player on the list above. The reasons for not doing so can be grouped as follows:

• Market Value > Value to VT (4: Chaplin, Delane, Moore, Phillips)

• Passed on depth chart (2: Fitzgerald, Givens)

Chaplin, Delane, and Moore are fringe NFL players. Tech could, and probably did, offer to compensate them as such.

However, out on the open market, they are all in the top 6 among available players at their respective position.

As markets go, the transfer portal is a mess. Maybe in the offseason I’ll have a go at disentangling it. Maybe.

For now, though, the key takeaway is that likely Day 3 NFL draft picks with P4 experience are very valuable (read: expensive) in the portal. There are not many of them, and each carries the potential to add another win to their new team’s total just by his addition.

The difference between 9-3 and 10-2 could very well be the difference between hosting a playoff game and playing in the Outback Bowl with a roster gutted by the portal.

The difference between 6-6 and 7-5 is essentially zilch.

No doubt, the offers from those SEC teams compared to Virginia Tech’s reflected this reality.

What the Hokies need is a lot of what former baseball general manager Dan Duquette called undervalued commodities. In short, the Hokies need 10-15 guys who can play as well as, or better, than the players they will replace.

The only way to pull off this strategy and net out neutral on NIL expenses is to sign players who lack P4, or maybe even FBS, experience. In some cases, it will also mean opting for players with non-ideal measurables.

As a final note, I would caution against judging position coaches with regard to the players they lose in the portal.

Often, it is not a question as to whether or not the Hokies can retain the player. Rather, the decision comes down to the cost to retain the player and how that amount impacts the program’s overall roster management strategy.

No longer is returning a bunch of starters from the previous year a valuable measure for predicting future success.

In the modern college game, what matters most is assembling the optimal mix of players each year that allows a given team to maximize its strengths and minimize its weaknesses.

It’s like precision tuning, college football style.

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“I think it’s important to understand that the job description isn’t just what you see on the field,” Pry said. “There’s recruiting, there’s relationships, there’s player development, there’s player production. All of it is very important. And when I evaluate coaches and staff members, the entire job description is part of that. Where are we meeting standards? Where are we not? And when not enough of those boxes are being checked, there’s a concerning issue.”
-Brent Pry, December 13, 2024 Press Conference

Brent Pry shared the above illuminating quote in a veiled reference to Ron Crook and the reasons why he was let go this week, but it also holds true for Chris Marve.

While the two coaches are very different, the root causes for each man’s dismissal are quite similar.

Namely, they struggled in recruiting, determining player positions, and allotting playing time.

To flesh this out, I thought it would be instructive to work through the framework by which the decisions were made, as laid out by Pry.

Christ Marve - Defensive Coordinator

What you saw on the field - an underachieving unit that, despite generally playing well in the first half of games, continually blew second half leads

Recruiting - Low Marks

Marve’s biggest recruiting failure was middle linebacker, where he was too often forced to play guys who were better suited to other positions (e.g., Alan Tisdale, Jaden Keller, Jayden McDonald). Aycen Stevens, the one true middle linebacker that Marve signed, ended up moving to defensive end. He got Sam Brumfield out of the portal, who was solid, if unspectacular, at mike in 2024.

Relationships - High Marks

By all reports, Marve is a highly intelligence “player’s coach”. There were no issues here.

Player Development - Neutral

Some may disagree here, but the eye test can be deceiving. Many of Marve’s linebackers improved year-over-year, and for those that didn’t, it was usually more a case of a guy trying to play a position to which he was ill-suited.

Guys who showed solid improvement under Marve’s tutelage include Dax Hollifield (2022), Jayden McDonald (2023), Jaden Keller (2024), and Caleb Woodson (2024).

Key players who did not improve during the Marve era include Alan Tisdale (2023), Keli Lawson (2023-24), and Sam Brumfield (2024). Tisdale and Lawson demonstrated notable declines, while Brumfield had already reached his ceiling before arriving at Virginia Tech.

Player Production - Low Marks

Outside of Dax Hollifield in 2022, inside linebacker play under Marve was middling at best, and atrocious at worst. It was a limiting factor in what he could do with the defense as its coordinator.

Verdict - Good Coach, Good Tactician, Bad Manager

Much of the criticism toward Marve has been about his supposed inability to adjust to what opposing offenses were throwing at him.

I do not find such an argument persuasive.

The Hokies won plenty of games in a blowout fashion, and Marve seemingly had no problem making adjustments to those opposing offenses.

Rather, it was Marve’s personnel choices that limited his adjustment options. Good teams were able to attack Tech’s weaknesses at middle linebacker and strong safety, forcing Marve to schematically cover up those deficiencies.

The result was that players at other positions were stressed beyond what they could handle.

Tech’s 2024 corners were good, but not great. Neither Strong nor Delane could truly lock down his side of the field. And when forced to play press man coverage every down, it was not a question of if there would be a lapse that led to a big play, but when.

Against Rutgers, Marve had to pick his poison. He the chose play-action rollout pass to the tight end over letting Kyle Monangai run wild. To Rutgers’ credit, they called that roll-out play over and over and over.

There, as so often during his tenure as the Hokies defensive coordinator, the sin lay not in the tactical decision, but rather in the personnel management that put Marve in a position of choosing between sub-optimal tactical options.

Ron Crook

What you saw on the field - a unit that improved from poor in 2022 (under Joe Rudolph) to average in 2023 to good in 2024 (the last two years under Crook)

Recruiting - Low Marks

Crook was responsible for the 2024 and 2025 offensive line classes (plus one portal acquisition prior to the start of the 2023 season), which had the following ratings according to 247Sports:

• 2023 - OT Clayton Frady (Transfer, 86)

• 2024 - OT Aidan Lynch (High School, 87); IOL Tommy Ricard (HS, 87); OT Web Davidson (HS, 85); OT Montavious Cunningham (T, 87)

• 2025 - IOL Nathaniel Wright (HS, 88); IOL Carter Stallard (HS, 87)

There is nothing particularly wrong with the high school recruits. Four out of the five were rated 87 or 88.

The problem is that there just were not enough of them. And that would be fine if Crook had shown any prowess in the portal.

However, that was not the case. Frady and Cunningham arrived as finished products, neither of which was competitive at the power conference level.

In fact, the portal acquisitions were so bad that they call into question Crook’s ability to evaluate talent.

Relationships - Low Marks

Chris Coleman over at TechSideline detailed the issues that led to mistrust between Crook and his players. I have nothing to add on this point.

Player Development - High Marks

Crook’s players showed solid development, both as individuals and as a unit.

The entire offensive line returned in 2024, and the year-over-year changes in each player’s PFF grades makes for a great apples-to-apples comparison.

It is important to keep in mind that nearly everything else was held constant. Same backfield, same receivers, same offensive coordinator, same position coaches.

In addition to the solid gains made by the starters, for first time in three years, the Hokies were able to rotate in some bench guys.

Crook had his weaknesses, but coaching was not one of them.

Player Production - High Marks

The 2024 offensive line was a good unit, one that paved the way for a great rushing attack and a solid passing game.

This season’s offense was the best since the 2016 unit led by Jerod Evans.

Considering that 247Sports did not rate any of this year’s offensive line starters higher than an 86 coming out of high school, I think we have to tip our collective hat to Crook.

Not only was he the best offensive line coach the Hokies could have gotten on the eve of spring practice in 2023, but he was arguably the best fit in the short-term, period.

Crook lived up to his reputation of turning low-talent offensive lines in serviceable units. In Tech’s case, he turned average talent into a good product.

Crook has never been a long-term solution, and he wasn’t going to be this time around either. But he put in two good years of work in Blacksburg.

One could argue that he should have been one-and-done, but keeping Crook was critical to the Hokies’ chances of winning eight to nine games in 2024.

The hope was that such success would make Tech a more attractive destination, compensating for Crook’s lack of recruiting prowess.

That did not work out, and now the Hokies are behind the eight-ball from a numbers perspective along the offensive line.

Verdict - Good Coach, Ok Tactician, Bad Manager

Crook’s simplified techniques help him get the most out of his players, but the limits of his teachings often became clear against better competition.

In the current environment, in which the number of on-field coaches has increased significantly, Crook is probably better suited to an assistant offensive line coaching role.

His sweet spot is probably the G5 level, but even there, he does not have the recruiting chops to be a long-term solution as the primary offensive line coach.

A few words on Dwight Galt

After the Duke game, I wrote about how the offensive scheme with Drones at quarterback is predicated on too many high impact collisions, which leads to key players getting injured.

However, you will also recall that I wrote all season about hidden injuries - guys who just magically disappeared (with little publicity) despite not suffering an obvious injury during a game.

There were a number of such suspected injuries on defense, especially early in the year.

I kept waiting to hear about surgery and rehab, but for the most part those reports did not come. Apparently, many were of the nagging, slow-to-heal nature.

When Pry, in his Friday press conference, talked about too many players not being in good shape to start the year, I suspect at least some of the suspected injuries I noted were a result of such conditioning issues.

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That masks a major, and thus far under-reported, evolution in the type of talent the Hokies are now attracting on the open market.

Before I break down the numbers, first let’s run through the four different types of transfers:

1. Highly rated as a prospect and highly rated as a transfer (think Caleb Williams, former Oklahoma and USC quarterback, and the #1 pick this year’s NFL Draft)

2. Highly rated as a prospect, but lower rated as a transfer (Antwaun Powell-Ryland)

3. Rated low as a prospect, but higher rated as a transfer (Derrick Canteen)

4. Rated low as a prospect and low as a transfer (Jason Brown)

You will note that I used a non-Hokie example for group #1 because Tech has yet to land a highly rated transfer who was also a highly rated prospect. But with the way things are trending, that could happen as soon as next offseason.

Selling more than a vision

A 7-6 record is not typically cause for celebration in Blacksburg, but the fanbase was nonetheless energized by the team’s play in 2023.

Why?

More than racking up convincing wins over middling (at best) opponents, I would argue that what fans reacted to most was the increasing frequency of elite level play by the Hokies:

• A mobile quarterback who was filling up highlight reels

• A dynamic running back who was electric in the open field

• Multiple threats in the receiving game

• A defensive line that lived in the backfield

• Special teams units that consistently outclassed the opponent

Hokie fans and pundits were not the only people taking notice. Rather than just selling a vision, as the staff did prior to the 2022 and 2023 seasons, in 2024 Pry & Co. could turn on the highlights and show the vision coming to fruition.

The results in terms of player acquisition, though they require a bit of quantitative digging, are meaningful.

Virginia Tech has won a lot of games by identifying and developing what former Baltimore Orioles General Manager Dan Duquette referred to as undervalued commodities; players whose on-field performance is greater than the cost of acquisition + direct compensation.

Nationwide, this group includes plenty of diamonds in the rough who will go on to have long NFL careers. More often than not, though, these players have lower ceilings, which is why they were not heavily recruited coming out of high school.

At Virginia Tech, the increase in high school rating among transfers is masked somewhat by four unrated players in the 2023 class. If we defaulted those players to a 75 rating, the cumulative rating for that class would be 81.3.

And that makes the comparison to the 2024 class, with its average rating of 88.3, all the more stark.

Possible impact on team performance

The 247Sports ratings are an indication of the player’s demand on the open market. A higher rating does not guarantee success, but players that are more in demand tend to outperform those for whom demand is lower.

So, why might it be a good idea to pursue transfers who were highly rated as high school prospects, but who are lower rated as transfers?

1. Higher athletic ceiling

2. Better fit (culture, staff, scheme, location) can unlock full player potential

3. Can help improve high school recruiting

Due diligence, however, is very important because, quantitatively at least, we’re talking about players who have underachieved in college. Major risks include:

1. Injuries that are actually chronic (or there other issues that keep the player off the field)

2. Still a tweener, even with a better system fit

3. Overrated coming out of high school

4. Failure to progress is mental (doesn’t pick up the finer nuances of the game) or emotional (lacks maturity or discipline)

That leaves us with the following question: Is the difference between transfer and high school rating predictive of the likelihood that a player will have an impact on the field for Virginia Tech?

To answer this question I tagged each incoming transfer in Pry’s first two transfer classes as either having an impact or not. I then took the average of the rating difference for each of the two groups (the sample size is too small to play with true statistics).

The result is that players who did not have an impact averaged a 6.5 point higher transfer rating, compared to just 2.9 for those that did have an impact on the team.

The average difference in ratings in the 2022 class was 5.3. For the 2023 class it was 2.4.

In contrast, the average difference for incoming 2024 transfers is -1.4, meaning that as a group, they had a higher high school rating.

If the results from our small sample size are a true indication of on-field impact, Tech fans might be pleasantly surprised at just how well these new Hokies will perform.

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After a few years of figuring out the new landscape, teams appear to have settled into a rhythm around their recruiting mix.

In this article, I will break down the numbers from 2022-24, taking averages of each ACC team’s overall national recruiting rank, high school rank, and transfer portal rank.

First, here are the three-year averages for each team:

At a high level, the rankings reveal that:

1. The ACC is full of mediocre programs.

2. Losing Clemson and Florida St. would all but end any realistic hope of a conference member competing for National Championships year-in and year-out.

3. The new member programs are better at recruiting than a lot of ACC fans probably realize.

Teams generally fall into one of three groups: reliant on high school recruiting, reliant on the transfer portal, or balanced. Most interesting is the fact that there does not seem to be one particular path toward building a conference title contender.

It’s more about finding out what works for each team given its location, culture, history, and expectations.

Dependent on high school recruiting

Clemson, North Carolina, Virginia Tech, Stanford, NC State, and Wake Forest

This group, from a football perspective, is the strongest. Stanford has been down in recent years, but the Cardinal had a very strong program in the 2010s. All the other teams are at least above average.

Clemson and Stanford are in this group by default because neither is active in the transfer portal.

The other four schools are all located in the same talent-rich area and compete against each other for high school recruits.

It says something about just how much talent there is in Virginia and North Carolina that there can exist four consistently good programs in such a small footprint.

Dependent on the transfer portal

Louisville, California, SMU, Syracuse, and Virginia

One could fairly divide this group into teams located in talent-rich states (Cal, SMU, and Virginia) and teams located in talent-poor states (Louisville and Syracuse).

The transfer portal is an obvious boon to teams located in areas devoid of high school talent. However, it is also helping prestigious public universities like Cal and UVA.

SMU is different. Football matters at SMU, and Texas is full of talent. What has held back the Mustangs in recent years (decades?) is conference affiliation.

Moving to ACC should help on that front and, indeed, after bringing in high school recruiting classes ranked 82nd, 72nd, and 108th since 2022, SMU’s 2025 class is currently ranked 22nd.

Even if that rank dips a bit as commitments roll in at other schools, SMU is now able to recruit at a much higher level. And they are.

Balanced

Miami, Florida St., Georgia Tech, Boston College, Pittsburgh, and Duke

Florida St. and Miami are name brands, nationally, so there is no surprise in seeing those two programs dominate in both recruiting categories.

Half of the teams in the group are private schools (Miami, Boston College, and Duke).

Three out of the four non-Florida schools are second-tier programs in their respective states (Georgia Tech, Pitt, and Duke).

Things, however, are not especially clean in this group. Take, for example, Georgia Tech. They were heavily dependent on the portal in Geoff Collins’s final years as head coach. Brent Key has turned that around and high school recruiting is now the main source for talent.

Over three years the averages give us the appearance of balance, but really, the Yellow Jackets are a recruiting operation in flux.

Offseason coaching changes at Boston College and Duke could have a similar impact in Chestnut Hill and Durham. Both schools are off to a strong start with their respective 2025 high school classes (BC - 47th and Duke - 31st).

A note about Cal, SMU, and Stanford

Virginia Tech is tied with Stanford for 6th place in average overall recruiting rank for the 2022-24 classes. Cal and SMU follow closely behind.

SMU, especially, appears primed to become an upper echelon team in the ACC. But don’t sleep on the California schools.

Yeah, yeah, I know they haven’t won a lot lately, but they recruit at a much higher level than most Tech fans would want them too.

And that should make trips out west, for as long as this crazy league remains a going entity, a dicey proposition.

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The Hokies have been on a recruiting roll recently, with a newly announced commitment appearing on social media seemingly every other day.

With expectations for a top 25 squad in 2024, there were some jitters this past spring when the Hokies appeared to be off to a slow start on the recruiting trail.

As the Hokies have caught up, at least in terms of raw numbers, many have noted that the recent commits are solid players, but that the class continues to lack true star power.

Still, the narrative remains positive. A common refrain is that recruiting ratings are never precise, and at best they are merely directional ahead of a player’s senior year.

Many fans (and pundits!) take that statement further, adopting a belief that the players committed to their favorite school are indeed underrated, and as other teams discover them, surely their ratings will improve.

To date, I am not aware, of any data that would support this assertion, or even the former, about how precise recruiting ratings are at this point in the cycle. So, I’ve decided to put both statements to the test.

This will be the first of four check-ins on Virginia Tech’s commitments for the class of 2025. The federal holiday schedule provides convenient intervals:

1. Independence Day

2. Labor Day

3. Thanksgiving

4. Signing Day

At this first interval, the Hokies have 14 firm commitments, and 247Sports rates the class 43rd, nationally.

Baseline

Currently, Tech only has two 4-star commits in the 2025 class, and both barely made it past the cutoff.

It is critical that the Hokies land top-10 caliber players from Virginia, and both Matthew Outten and Brett Clatterbaugh check that box. However, neither is a true class headliner at a top-25 level program.

The Hokies need to sign another player or two in this range, then add a couple more highly rated players.

The rest of Tech’s current high school commits are 3-star players, with more on the high side (maroon) than the low side (orange).

Subjectively, I’m happy the Hokies took a flier on Chinwike. Every class should include one to two high ceiling, under the radar guys at the bottom. Everyone mentions Christian Darrisaw as an example of this type of recruit, but Dorian Strong was a similar case.

Tracking progress

At a high level, this exercise will track the standing of the 2025 class of high school recruits who commit to Virginia Tech.

Collecting point-in-time data at intervals of two to three months will also enable us to drill into precisely what drives changes in the overall rank of Tech’s class.

Often times, the sheer number of recruits in a large class can elevate a school’s recruiting ranking above its peers.

Other times, it is landing one or more highly rated players, increases in the ratings of currently committed players, or some combination therein.

Importantly, we will finally have the quantitative evidence to say for sure whether the recruiting ratings really change all that much during the cycle.

With that information, we will be able to draw some conclusions about Pry & Co.’s scouting and player evaluation. If the staff is finding good players under-the-radar and gaining their early commitment, this dataset will reveal it.

The currently committed players are pretty tightly bunched together in terms of their composite rating, with plenty of room for their respective rating to increase or decrease over time.

And since we are looking solely at the composite rating, we won’t have to worry about wild swings from any one recruiting site.

Personally, I do not expect to see significant changes in player ratings, but I do look forward to adding quantitative context to what is too often a rah-rah aspect of the sport.

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The Purdue game that was delayed due to weather eventually came down to a last minute drive with the Hokies down by a touchdown, but that’s about it for drama.

Perhaps that will be the case again in 2024, but in case it’s not, the coaching staff has built a roster designed to win in pressure-packed, late-game situations.

While the sporting press has devoted appropriate attention to the number of starters the Hokies will return off last year’s team, few have focused on just how experienced the 2024 team is, and how much that matters in close games.

Offense

Imagine the Hokies take possession of the ball down by a score with about two minutes remaining in a must-win game. Who is likely to touch the ball?

Senior center Kaden Moore will snap the ball back to redshirt junior dual-threat QB Kyron Drones.

Up front, the Hokies will have two to three senior linemen and, importantly, no freshmen.

If the Hokies look to play it safe, they could run the ball with senior RB Bhayshul Tuten. However, Tuten is also a reliable receiver, so Drones might look to swing a pass to him out of the backfield.

If Drones looks to throw down the field, he is likely to target one of the following five senior pass catchers:

• Ali Jennings (WR)

• Da’Quan Felton (WR)

• Jaylin Lane (WR)

• Stephen Gosnell (WR)

• Nick Gallo (TE)

What do Virginia Tech’s biggest come-from-behind wins all have in common? They were led by dual-threat quarterbacks:

• Michael Vick at West Virginia (1999)

• Bryan Randall at Georgia Tech (2004)

• Logan Thomas against Miami (2011)

Vick (R-Fr) and Thomas (R-So) were on the younger side, but both were throwing to senior wide receivers. And, in both cases, it was a long quarterback run that proved decisive:

• Vick’s scramble up the sideline to get the Hokies into field goal range

• Thomas’s 19-yard QB-keeper on 4th down for the go-ahead touchdown

Randall, though a dual-threat, was in the opposite situation - he was a senior who was throwing to a bunch of freshmen (and David Clowney, who was a true sophomore).

The 2024 Hokies have the best of both worlds. Drones is in his fourth year (just like Randall, who never redshirted), and he is surrounded by seniors at all the other skill positions.

It doesn’t matter who the opponent is or where the game is being played, with so many experienced guys, one would have to feel really good about the Hokies being about to drive the ball down the field late in a game to tie or take the lead.

Defense

One thing that has quietly irked Hokie fans in recent years is the defense’s inability to get stops in key situations. And no situation is bigger than end of a game with a lead of eight points or less.

The Tech defenses that historically have excelled in these situations shared a few traits in common:

• Experienced, lock-down cornerbacks

• Defensive line that could generate pressure without a blitz

• Defensive line that went two-deep with experienced players at all four positions

Once again, the 2024 Hokies check all of the boxes. Dorian Strong is entering his fifth season as a starting CB at Tech with All-American aspirations. Mansoor Delane will be a third-year starter, and he should make an All-ACC team this year.

Up front, all four defensive ends in the two-deep are in at least their third year of college football, and all have demonstrated an ability to get to the quarterback.

At defensive tackle, the Hokies could be even better than last year, with a group that goes a legit three-deep at both inside positions.

What does all this mean in game situations? Let’s compare the 2004 Miami ending to Boise State’s two-minute go-ahead drive in 2010.

At Miami, nursing a six-point lead, the Hokies locked down the Hurricane wide receivers and smothered QB Brock Berlin with unrelenting pressure. That was the game in which defensive tackle Jim Davis batted down passes on third and fourth down to seal the victory.

The 2004 Hokies were solid at safety and linebacker, but late in the game, with a conference championship on the line, it didn’t matter - they were non-factors. Bud Foster rushed four guys and the Canes’ front could not stop them.

Out wide, Jimmy Williams and Eric Green were asked to hold up in coverage for less than two seconds, which they did with ease.

Against Boise St., Tech was clinging to a four-point lead with about two minutes to go in the game. After a rough start, the defense had settled down and played pretty well in the second half. But, with the game on the line, Boise St. attacked Tech’s weaknesses.

First, the Tech defensive line was inexperienced and not particularly talented. The guys who started had been around the program for years, but had been buried on the depth chart. Steven Friday was a decent rusher, but no one else was much of a threat.

In addition, that line was not very deep, so the starters were tired. As a result, Kellen Moore had plenty of time to scan the field and go through his progressions.

Tech was also young in the secondary. Jayron Hosley would go on to lead the nation that year in interceptions, but against Boise St. he was a first-time starter. Antone Exum was a freshman safety and Kyle Fuller was also a freshmen.

All that youth was plain to see as Bronco receivers were given big cushions out wide. Kellen Moore didn’t have the strongest arm, but given time and space he was nearly unstoppable. The result that night was a gut-wrenching loss for the Hokies.

Special Teams

John Love made 22 out of 24 field goals last year, and the entire place kicking operation was generally boring. Snaps were good, holds were good, and kicks were good.

Although none of those kicks were in especially tense situations, there is clearly every reason to believe that Love and the rest of that unit would perform at a similarly high level with the game on the line.

Peter Moore will return as the punter in 2024 for his redshirt senior year. Moore averaged 43.1 yards per punt last year, with 19 punts travelling at least 50 yards. Seventeen of Moore’s punts were downed inside the opponents 20-yard line. Again, coaches and fans all have confidence in Moore, who will be starting for the fourth consecutive year.

Closing Thoughts

Over the course of a twelve game season, every good team gets tested. The 2024 Hokies have the makings of a very good, but not elite team.

One way for a team to post results that exceed its talent level is to excel in crunch time. In that regard, the 2024 Hokies could potentially be the best in school history.

So, keep this article in mind this fall and revisit it when a Tech game goes down to the wire.

All indications are that Tech should emerge victorious.

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The myth and the lore around those great Frank Beamer teams is such that one could be forgiven for thinking it was all by design. But it wasn’t. Beamer worked with what, or rather who, was available.

It is common knowledge among college football fans that the three states with the most and the best talent are: California, Florida, and Texas. My understanding had long been that those three states were more or less equal.

I was wrong. California is a distant third, not far ahead of Georgia.

It’s no wonder the Bulldogs are so good these days. Georgia is the fourth best state for upper echelon high school talent, and it is located just north of Florida, which ranks second. The University of Georgia is also the only school in the state that plays big boy football (apologies to the Yellow Jackets of Georgia Tech).

But in-state talent is not solely determinative of a program’s ability to recruit at a high level. Regional talent is an equal, if not greater, factor.

Alabama vs. Virginia

To illustrate my point, let’s compare the Commonwealth of Virginia with the state of Alabama.

Nick Saban won six National Championships at the University of Alabama from 2009 through 2023 and Auburn played for the title in 2013, while both Virginia and Virginia Tech saw only limited, fleeting success during the same time period.

In terms of top 500 high school players, as per the 247 composite rankings each year dating back to the 2009 recruiting class, the state of Alabama is eighth with 246 such recruits, just ahead of Virginia with 208.

So, if Alabama and Virginia have comparable levels of in-state talent and two P4 teams each, why are the Alabama schools traditionally better than the Virginia schools?

Consider the talent in Alabama’s neighboring states in terms of ranking of top 500 players:

• #2 Florida

• #4 Georgia

• #6 Louisiana

• #10 Tennessee

Under Nick Saban, the Crimson Tide recruited nationally, securing commitments from Da’Shawn Hand of Virginia and Bryce Young of California, among many others, but that was a luxury, not a necessity. The Tide can win National Championships with homegrown and regional talent, even with all the other programs recruiting those same areas.

Now, let’s compare Alabama’s border states to Virginia Tech’s footprint, which extends beyond neighboring states to encompass the six-hour radius:

• #7 North Carolina

• #10 Tennessee

• #12 Pennsylvania

• #14 Maryland

• #17 South Carolina

• #30 Kentucky

• #36 Washington, DC

• #43 West Virginia

The discrepancy shows that, all else held constant, regional high school talent alone explains much of the difference in on-field success between Virginia Tech and Alabama.

Talent acquisition vs. available talent

As I highlighted on the podcast this week, the Hokies do not recruit at consistent levels across all positions. Let’s consider three particular examples from the podcast: quarterback, offensive line, and defensive back.

Quarterback

Despite inconsistent play in recent years from its non-transfer quarterbacks, the Hokies have fared well in quarterback recruiting, with a higher average player rank since 2009 than any other position.

Part of Tech’s success in recruiting quarterbacks comes from the fact that Virginia (#8) and North Carolina (#6, tie) are among the top 10 states for top 500 ranked high school quarterback recruits since 2009. Combined, the two states have produced an average of two such quarterbacks each year for the last 16 years.

There are six ACC schools in those two states, which means if the talent were distributed evenly, and no outside schools poached players, each team would get one such quarterback every three years. Of course, talent is not distributed evenly, so given the available talent, it is easy to see how some programs (ahem, ahem, UVA) are often left standing when the music stops.

Offensive line

At the other end of the spectrum is offensive line recruiting, where the Hokies have brought in players with the lowest average national ranking of any position on their roster.

While neighboring Tennessee (#6) and North Carolina (#9) are in the top 10 states for top 500 ranked offensive lineman, Virginia is not. Virginia is 17th, behind Maryland (#12) and Pennsylvania (#13).

With a comparative shortage of highly ranked in-state linemen, is it any wonder that the o-line is often the Hokies’ weakest link on the field? Conversely, it makes sense that Ron Crook's regional recruiting ties were prioritized over experience inside the Commonwealth.

Of the five regular starters on offensive line in 2023, only right tackle Parker Clements is from Virginia. Xavier Chaplin is from South Carolina, the Moore brothers Pennsylvania, and Bob Schick is from Utah.

Defensive Back

For the first decade of the 21st century, Virginia Tech could and did lay claim to the moniker DBU. Those claims dropped off significantly in recent years, but the position is still one of relative strength for the team.

So, it was surprising to find that among position groups, it was middle of the pack at Virginia Tech in terms of average national player ranking.

Virginia (#9) and Maryland (#10) are among the top 10 stages nationally in defensive backs in the top 500 over the last 16 recruiting classes, but combined, the 57 such recruits from those two states is only 26% of the total that came out of Florida alone.

In the peak Beamer years, defensive backs mostly hailed from Virginia (Jimmy Williams, DeAngelo Hall, and many others) or Florida (Brandon Flowers, Torrian Gray, etc.).

In the last decade or so, the Hokies have done less recruiting in Florida, resulting in more defensive backs coming from Maryland (among them the Fuller brothers and Mansoor Delane).

Takeaways

The key takeaway is that Virginia Tech’s recruiting is limited by the available talent in the region, which is good, but pales in comparison to the Southeast and California.

Winning at a high level requires elite player development and selective national recruitment in the transfer portal.

Tech has recently begun acquiring out of the transfer portal high level regional prospects that originally went to blue blood programs, such as Antwaun Powell-Ryland (Florida) and Kelvin Gilliam (Oklahoma). That is an important trend that needs to continue in the future.

After all, while it would be nice to fill the roster with blue chip recruits, what matters most is that they are on the roster by the time they are ready to play, which is often after two or three years in college.

Every college football program’s success depends first and foremost on its ability to secure commitments from a significant chunk of the best in-state talent.

During the peak Beamer years, Virginia Tech consistently landed many of the top in-state recruits. Over time, though, competition for these players has increased.

The 247 composite numbers are complete dating back to the 2009 recruiting class, so I broke the 16 years of data into the following groups:

• Late Beamer Era: 2009-2012 (the recruiting classes following 10-win seasons)

• Twilight Beamer Era: 2013-2015 (Beamer’s final years)

• Fuente Era: 2016-2021

• Pry Era: 2022-2024

Each era is distinct, not just for how Virginia Tech fared on the recruiting trail, but how other schools were faring. This analysis looks solely at top 1000 recruits nationally from Virginia and where they committed.

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Weaknesses in 247’s rating system

Let’s lead off with the biggest weakness of 247’s rating system: it does not factor in mental or emotional intelligence. So, the 247 rating tells us nothing about a player’s ability to play in a complex system or how well a player holds up in moments of acute stress.

It also does not offer any clue about the degree to which the player is likely to make other players around him better. And, as a recently retired head coach of some repute once explained, that matters.

A shorter version of that speech by Coach Saban made the rounds on Twitter/X earlier this month. This longer version really captures the sheer amount, and importance, of intangibles that are found in winning football players. None are measured in the 247 ratings.

Leadership skills are easily measured by looking at which players were captains on their high school team. Getting that data for every high school player would be a nightmare, and 247 is not explicit either way about its inclusion.

Additionally, there is no qualitative component measuring dedication, willingness and ability to play through pain, or home life and mentors.

Physically, the 247 ratings do not measure a recruit’s fit for a given system. That would be nearly impossible on a macro level, with coaches constantly moving around and, even when they stay, making tweaks depending on their personnel.

Strengths of 247’s rating system

The 247 ratings are quite good at projecting physical ability. Not perfect, but pretty darn good. Remember, it’s all about percentages. A two-star prospect is considered an FCS-level player. But players get drafted off FCS rosters every year. It just happens at a much lower percentage than FBS players, than 4-star players, and than 5-star players.

For this reason, it is a great starting point. The last mile problem remains, though, and to my knowledge, there is no comprehensive (read: national) solution.

For Virginia Tech, the best solution is Chris Coleman’s modified star ratings. Unfortunately, TSL does not give those ratings their own section on their website. Still, if you are a regular TSL reader, you will see them pop up from time to time, and they are, to my mind, the most accurate measure of Virginia Tech recruits.

Do recruiting ratings matter?

In November 2019, Justin Fuente received a verbal commitment from Dematrius Davis, a highly decorated 4-star quarterback out of Houston. At that point in the cycle, Fuente and the Hokies were rolling sevens in recruiting, and excitement was returning within the fanbase after the disastrous 2018 season.

Then, on May 6, 2020, Davis de-committed. Eleven days later he committed to Auburn, where he signed, despite the mess that was the dismissal of Gus Malzahn and the hiring of Bryan Harsin.

After one season at Auburn, Davis hit the portal and ended up at FCS Alabama St., where he plays for Eddie Robinson Jr. (son of the Hall of Fame Grambling coach). In two seasons, Davis has thrown for 1,614 yards, with 10 TDs and 7 INTs. He has been sacked 29 times (despite only 219 passing attempts).

It’s safe to say that Davis has been a complete bust and that his de-commitment was probably for the best. But at the time, it was a big deal.

There were two schools of thought at the time:

1. High school recruits are fickle - ignore the noise and only pay attention to those who sign on the dotted line

2. This is a big loss for Fuente and the Virginia Tech program, and may mortally wound this staff

In the end, both opinions were correct. No one actually knew whether or not Davis would be any good at Tech, but Davis was in high demand, and the fact that Fuente & Co. could not maintain his commitment through signing day signaled a weakness within the Virginia Tech football program.

Evaluating recruits based on their ratings

Alright, so what’s a fan to make of all this?

On the individual level, here are the guiding principals I abide by:

1. In the aggregate, higher ratings are better than lower ratings

2. Take note of five-star recruits, but four- (90-97) and high three-star (87-89) recruits are fungible, meaning that fit matters, so group them together in your mind

3. Regular three-star recruits (84-86), who 247 projects to become capable starters, can and do reach that potential and more, but in big games, their lack of ideal size and/or athleticism often becomes noticeable

4. Keep an eye out for low three (80-83) and two-star (70-79) recruits; while too many signify a struggling recruiting operation, if there are one or two in a class, they are potential diamonds in the rough who could become impact players (e.g., Dorian Strong and Christian Darrisaw)

On the team level, to compete for a bid to the expanded playoff, the Hokies will need a team talent ranking in the mid-30s, and probably in the 20s or better to actually make the playoff. Here, it’s less about the individual rating and more about the ranking, or how the rating compares to other teams.

A few spots difference either way in team talent does not matter. What is important is being in the same ballpark. Size and athleticism are necessary, but not sufficient. There are many other determinative factors that are not currently quantifiable on a macro scale.

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Commenting on the star system of player evaluation, Beamer wrote (pg. 188-189):

I don’t pay much attention to the “star ratings.” Right now, there are many services out there that rank players on a one-to-five-star rating. I hear from fans all the time who ask me, “Why aren’t we signing more five-star guys?”

Well, for one, I don’t put much stock in those ratings. Most aren’t based on scouts who actually watch the player play the game. Sometimes, they are even based on who is recruiting the player. If Notre Fame, Michigan, and Texas happen to be recruiting him, well, then he must be a five-star player…

…I could name dozens of players who have come through Virginia Tech with not many stars attached to their name and then left as all-conference or even All-Americans. We didn’t beat anybody to sign Shyrone Stith. We beat only Wake Forest to sign Lee Suggs. [Current Safeties Coach] Pierson Prioleau was a so-called two-star guy and he left here as an All-American. There were so many more.

Because all recruiting ratings are imperfect, I generally utilize the 247Composite rating, which aggregates bias by averaging out where each player stands across all the ratings services.

However, to better understand what these ratings actually tell us, let’s put 247’s in-house rating under the microscope.

What the 247 rating actually represents

On its rating explanation page, 247 states that their “ultimate goal is to accurately project college success with an element of raw ability baked in. To that end, we have turned to the NFL Draft as the measuring stick and answer key that best indicates, in a quantitative manner, the level of success and ability players showcased during their college careers.”

To be clear, the rating projects likelihood of draft position, which serves as a proxy measure of college success. This is a really important distinction because the college and pro games are very different.

For example, lots of quarterbacks and left tackles get drafted in the first round because they are very valuable - there are precious few players at those positions who can perform at the elite level required by the NFL.

Of the three players Beamer cited in his book when discussing recruiting ratings, here is where they landed in the NFL draft:

• Shyrone Stith - 7th round selection in 2000

• Lee Suggs - 4th round selection in 2003

• Pierson Prioleau - 4th round selection in 1999

247 was not founded until 2010, but in general, were these three Hokie greats underrated coming out of high school? Yes. However, if the ultimate goal is to project NFL draft likelihood (and round) as opposed to college success, then they were not as underrated as many in Hokie Nation might think.

Not only is NFL draft status an imperfect proxy for college success, it is also an imperfect means of projecting future success in the NFL (which 247 is careful to state).

Regarding points of emphasis, 247 explains (emphasis added):

Due to our NFL Draft guiding principles, we take some cues as to trends and points of emphasis related to positional value and geographic origination. By our final Top247 and five-star release, we try to meet some standard thresholds for which regions typically produce the most players and which positions tend to get drafted at a higher rate and are valued higher than others. 

Did you catch that? Players from talent rich areas that play high value positions benefit from additional weighting. No doubt, this phenomena has led to overrating certain players from the 757 in recent years who ended up being busts in college. It also really benefits players from Florida, Texas, and California - the hottest of hotbeds when it comes to recruiting.

Hokie fans have long speculated, and complained, about the propensity for recruits to see their ratings take off when they receive offers from a blue-blood school.

247 does not explicitly state whether or not there is a blue blood benefit, but this section of their explainer would appear to cover such a weighting scheme if it existed (again, emphasis added):

Based on exhaustive analytical studies of NFL Draft results and retroactive looks at NFL Draft picks as high school prospects, we have established position-by-position principles that are most predictive of college football success that we use to inform our position rankings.

Based on that text, the formula might apply a multiplier to the rating of quarterback recruits with Big 12 offers (since the Big 12 produces prolific passers who tend to get drafted early in the NFL). For offensive linemen, it might be recruits with Big Ten and SEC offers that get the multiplier boost.

While such a weighting system might improve the accuracy of the ratings regarding who is most likely to get drafted (and drafted early), it would be a self-reinforcing mechanism that distorts comparisons between players and teams.

Perhaps that is how we ended up with Alabama entering the 2023 season with the highest team talent rating in the country. Anyone with eyes could see that was not the case in reality. In fact, this year’s edition of the Crimson Tide was one of Saban’s least talented based on their on-field performance. (My eyes are still reeling from that USF game…)

In sum, 247 combines measurables and on-field performance to project the likelihood of each player getting drafted.

What could go wrong?

(Tune in next week to find out!)

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For the first time since the portal became a thing, we are getting clean (albeit limited) data out of the Virginia Tech football program about the interplay between player evaluation, NIL, and how the coaching staff manages the roster.

Why has it taken so long? Let us count the ways:

• ‘18-’19 - the portal launches, but it is new and haphazard (see: the Hendon Hooker saga - he’s enters the portal, Braxton Burmeister transfers to VT, Knox Kadum signs with VT, Hooker returns to VT)

• ‘19-’20 - more activity, but moves are driven mostly by playing time and novelty, Covid arrives and spring ball is canceled

• ‘20-’21 - following the Covid season people are frustrated and looking to change anything they can control in their lives, Fuente is on the hot seat

• ‘21-’22 - first year of NIL, collectives launch, Fuente fired and Pry hired, player moves largely driven by coaching change

• ‘22-’23 - after year 1 of the Pry era the coaching staff actively seeks to turn over the roster with focus on acquisition at the skill positions

The Hokies went 6-6 in 2023, with an appearance in the Military Bowl upcoming. The program has momentum, and while the Kyron Drones offense is different than the one Grant Wells ran, the intent was always to be a run-first team capable of explosive plays both on the ground and through the air.

This is all to say that there is finally stability inside and outside the football program. And with stability, the moves this portal season are much easier to classify and evaluate.

How this works

Up front, I want to state that I am not a reporter, and I do not have any inside sources. However, from studying the available data points, here is what I believe happens to set the portal in motion.

Starting around the beginning of November, the coaching staff looks at their player evaluations and buckets the players into groups such as:

• Must keep

• Nice to keep

• Cut

The Must Keep group is allotted a significant share of the total NIL pot. These players will receive handsome raises. This group likely totals between 5 and 10 players, and there may be a sliding scale that gets applied, either by the coaches or the collectives when considering deal size (perhaps subgroups).

The Nice to Keep group is allotted the remainder of the NIL money. This share likely totals no more than 33% of the total, and probably less. It is split among all the returning contributors who the coaches would like to see return, but who are replaceable.

The Cut group, obviously, receives nothing.

Immediately following the final regular season game, Pry sits down with each player to evaluate that player’s performance and future with the program.

When a player is slated to be cut, he is not kicked off the team. Rather, he is gently shown the door, with a promise to help that player find a new opportunity where the player can get more playing time.

Concurrently, the collectives meet with the Must Keep and Nice to Keep players.

Between the talk with Pry and the financial offers presented by the collectives, the players are able to gauge their relative priority status and value within the program.

If they are satisfied with both, then they stay. If not, then they enter the portal.

Grouping the portal entrants

At this point, the 2023 Virginia Tech portal entrants appear to fall into one of three categories:

1. Bad fit culturally

2. Want/need more playing time

3. Cuts

Let’s drill down on each group.

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He made the right decision.

The 247 Composite ranks Cole as:

• #56 player in the nation

• #6 linebacker in the nation

• #1 player in Virginia

To give you some context, his 0.9697 composite rating puts Cole on par with Logan Thomas. The last time the Hokies landed such a highly rated defensive recruit was Kendall Fuller in 2013.

And he was a legacy (see: Vincent, Corey, and Kyle).

According to ESPN, there are 18 Hokies currently on NFL rosters, and 48 Georgia Bulldogs.

Not only does Georgia have more than twice as many players in the NFL as Virginia Tech, but the Bulldogs have a massive advantage when it comes to helping linebackers reach the next level.

Second Place Matters

While it would have helped the perception of the program, a Chris Cole commitment would not have changed the product on the field that much in the short term.

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My answer: 2005.

That was the first of two straight top-ranked defenses by yards allowed. While the 2006 team put up the better numbers (with an assist from the schedule), the 2005 team had, by far, more talent.

How much more?

Well, take the 2006 defense, then add NFL draft picks Jimmy Williams (2nd round), Darryl Tapp (2nd), James Anderson (3rd), Jonathan Lewis (6th), and Justin Hamilton (7th).

As a refresher, here is a list of the defensive starters in 2005, along with their official heights and weights:

• Darryl Tapp, DE - 6’1”, 265 lbs.

• Jonathan Lewis, DT - 6’1”, 296 lbs.

• Carlton Powell, DT - 6’2”, 292 lbs.

• Chris Ellis, DE - 6’5”, 250 lbs.

• Xavier Adibi, LB - 6’2”, 224 lbs.

• Vince Hall, LB - 6’0”, 236 lbs.

• James Anderson, LB - 6’3”, 232 lbs.

• Jimmy Williams, CB - 6’3”, 216 lbs.

• Roland Minor, CB - 6’0”, 205 lbs.

• Justin Hamilton, FS - 6’3”, 222 lbs.

• Aaron Rouse, ROV - 6’4”, 221 lbs.

The averages, by position group, among the starters were:

• Defensive Line - 74.3 inches, 275.8 lbs.

• Linebacker - 73.7 inches, 230.7 lbs.

• Defensive Back - 74.5 inches, 216 lbs.

I write all that by way of preface. Consider the above to be as close to perfect as Virginia Tech has ever gotten. And realize, those were the measurements for the starters. The bench guys, including both the over- and underweight, were not included. Average weights for the entire defense were as follows:

• Defensive Line - 279.0 lbs.

• Linebacker - 224.4 lbs.

• Defensive Back - 185 lbs.

What stands out immediately in the starters’ numbers is the size and length in the backend, as well as at linebacker. As Bud’s defenses went, this one was huge. In addition, the 31 lb. difference between the starting defensive backs and all defensive backs is noteworthy. Hamilton, Rouse, and Williams were uniquely gifted and blessed with incredible size. To my knowledge, never before and never since had Tech started such huge players in the secondary.

Brent Pry’s defense (yes, it’s still Pry’s, even if Marve is coordinating, in the same way that Alabama features Nick Saban’s defense) evolved from Foster’s, but there are some key differences in player types. So, first we’ll establish the Pry template, then we’ll examine the state of the Virginia Tech defense, and how much progress needs to be made.

Pry and Foster template differences

If we consider Penn St.’s defenses from 2018-2022, which, although he left for Blacksburg in December 2021, were essentially all built by Brent Pry, we can get a sense of the types of player body types with which he filled his rosters. Those averages are:

• Defensive Line - 75.4 inches, 277.1 lbs.

• Linebacker - 73.6 inches, 229.9 lbs.

• Defensive Back - 71.3 inches, 189.4 lbs.

The quick takeaway is that in comparison Bud, Pry looked for more length up front, and was content to play with less length in the secondary.

The linebacker numbers (PSU last five years vs. 2005 VT) are nearly the same, but one must consider that the 2005 starting group was abnormally lengthy. In general, we should probably expect a taller linebacking core in 2026 than we saw in 2022, and already the two-deep in 2023 seems to be moving in that direction.

Baseline vs. the ACC and Penn St.

Bud was known to trade size for speed, quickness, and, in the case of defensive linemen, twitchiness. After Bud’s retirement, Hamilton sought to get more space eaters and more length on the defensive line. The length, especially, could have been a helpful lead-in for Pry. However, many of those players, especially in the 2020 class, quickly washed out of the program.

As a result, whereas Penn St. defensive linemen have been comparatively tall and heavy the last five years, Virginia Tech’s DL has been short and light. If one assumes a 50 lb. spread between the average DT and DE, then we’re looking at defensive tackles around 290 lbs. and defensive ends at 240 lbs. And it’s not like those smaller ends have been burners coming off the edge. Overall, there is still a lot of work to do up front.

Tech is in a much better position talent and size-wise at linebacker. In fact, if the defense clicks for everyone, we could see six different guys play meaningful snaps at the three linebacker positions.

From a size perspective, I would expect the 2023 Virginia Tech two-deep at linebacker to be much closer to the Penn St. averages. In fact, this could be the tallest linebacking corps we’ve seen in Blacksburg in recent memory. Keonta Jenkins, Jaden Keller, Alan Tisdale, Jayden McDonald, Keli Lawson, and Stone Snyder are all at least 6’3” tall.

The Hokies are already much bigger in the backend than Pry’s Penn St. teams were. But then again, so is every other ACC team - the Hokies are basically mid-pack in the conference.

It’s not like Tech is going to shrink its secondary. In fact, Cam Johnson, the lightest DB on the roster in 2022, transferred out earlier in the offseason.

Entering last season, I found it curious that Dorian Strong had not bulked up. He’s always been skinny, and we saw a lot of other guys get stronger. But looking at the Penn St. numbers makes me think agility is far and away the most important attribute for a Pry DB. The early evidence is that Pry will not hesitate to move a bigger safety (like Jenkins and J.R. Walker in 2022) to the SAM linebacker position.

The biggest difference between Pry and Bud from player template perspective is that Bud prioritized length in the backend, while Pry seems to value more length near the line of scrimmage. That, and much heavier defensive linemen.

The Hokies have been too small up front in recent years, and only average at linebacker and in the secondary compared to the rest of the ACC. The result has been a defense that wears down over time. Getting bigger at key positions (I’m looking at you d-line) will involve a combination of recruiting and strength and conditioning. Sadly, there is no quick fix.

Needless to say, I will be paying very close attention to the updated heights and weights when they are released in August. At that point, we should have a better understanding of how much progress has been made, and how much work still remains to be done.

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Anyone who has ever bought a used car knows that looks can be deceiving. If the deal appears too good to be true, it probably is.

Chris Coleman of Techsideline noted in an article this week that the Hokies are hosting a couple of portal guys on official visits this weekend.

Josh Wallace is a cornerback from UMass, and Mason Williams is an offensive lineman from Harvard. Neither is likely to excite the fanbase or strike fear into the heart of any SEC team.

A quick check reveals a surprising number of supposedly highly ranked players still unsigned in the portal. With two scholarships available, Tech is still in add mode. So, in addition to the players visiting this weekend, Tech has probably evaluated some of these more highly rated players.

From a nationwide list, we can whittle the numbers down by only including players that play positions of need, match Pry’s recruiting philosophy (they are from within the six-hour radius), or are leaving a program with which Virginia Tech’s coaching staff has a known connection (Note: the keyword here is “known” - coaches have almost unlimited connections within the business, many of which are unknown) :

• 2 players match the recruiting philosophy

• 3 players are leaving a program with a connection to the VT coaching staff

I do not know if the Hokies are actually recruiting any of these guys, but from a numbers perspective, they almost certainly would have evaluated all of them. A little tire kicking quickly separates the contenders from the pretenders.

Recruiting Philosophy

There are two players in the recruiting footprint that Virginia Tech has now probably evaluated twice - once under Justin Fuente while they were in high school and once now under Brent Pry.

Ja’Qurious Conley, S, 6’1” 215 lbs.

• High School: Northside, Jacksonville, NC, 2020

• High School National Ranking: 150

• High School Rating: 0.9333, 4-star

• Origin: UNC

• Entered Portal: April 24

Ja’Qurious Conley started 10 games in 2021. He suffered a major knee injury against Wofford late in the year that not only ended his season, but also limited him to appearing in just two games in 2022.

Conley was very productive against Virginia Tech in the 2021 season opener in Lane Stadium. He finished that game with seven tackles, an interception, and a fumble recovery.

Per PFF, in 2021 he played 495 defensive snaps and graded out at 54.8. His overall grade was weighed down by a 46.2 tackling grade.

Ironically, he was much better as a rotational player during the 2020 Covid season. In 295 snaps, he earned a 65.0 defensive grade and a very strong 84.2 tackling grade.

Conley has two seasons of eligibility remaining. As a true freshman in 2020 he certainly played to his top 150 national ranking coming out of high school. However, a sophomore slump (or was it really just a UNC slump - seemingly everyone gets worse in that defense) followed by significant missed time due to injury makes him far from a sure thing.

At his best, Conley plays with an “aggressive and explosive mentality”. At Virginia Tech, he would likely compete with Jalen Stroman for playing time.

Yousef Mugharbil, OL, 6’5”, 311 lbs.

• High School: Murphy, Murphy, NC, 2021

• High School National Ranking: 269

• High School Rating: 0.9056, 4-star

• Origin: Colorado (played at Florida in 2022)

• Entered Portal: April 26

An SEC Honor Roll awardee for the Fall 2022 semester, Yousef Mugharbil is entering his redshirt sophomore season. He originally committed to Florida under Dan Mullen, and he had an impressive offer list (Arkansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Penn St., and Tennessee).

After two seasons of not seeing the field, Mugharbil transferred to Colorado. One semester of Coach Prime was enough for him, and now he searching for his third school in six months.

His 247 high school scouting report suggests a possible fit with Ron Crook’s style:

Thick but not oversized as an offensive line prospect. Length and skillset could push him more towards the offensive interior. Nasty run blocker that plays through the whistle. Seeks second level defenders with urgency. Athletic enough to keep his feet and find additional work as a downfield blocker. Very inexperienced as a pass blocker but shows an effective kick step against suspect pass rush threats. Not a sudden mover at the snap. Needs to be more active with his hands. Can get top heavy at times. You don’t see him move big bodies as a high school run blocker.

Given his inexperience, Mugharbil would probably be a depth piece at Virginia Tech in 2023, with the potential to compete for rotational snaps in 2024.

Coaching Connections

Three players come from schools with connections to the VT staff, although those connections are not particularly strong. Ron Crook was on the staff at Cincinnati that originally evaluated Mario Eugenio, J.C. Price still has connections to the defensive coaches at Marshall, his previous stop, and Shane Beamer is South Carolina’s head coach.

Mario Eugenio, EDGE, 6’3”, 245 lbs.

• High School: Gaither, Clearwater, FL, 2022

• High School National Ranking: 276

• High School Rating: 0.9047, 4-star

• Origin: Cincinnati

• Entered Portal: December 9

Mario Eugenio pleaded guilty to three counts of criminal mischief back in April. The charges stemmed from an incident in which “he smacked three women in the buttocks while riding a Bird scooter”, according to the affidavit. The incidents occurred on three separate days in September 2022.

A hardened criminal? No. An immature kid? Most definitely.

On the field, he has potential. He redshirted in 2022 and has four years of eligibility remaining.

Eugenio’s 247 scouting report describes him as “an effort-based player” who has experience “lining up in both a two and three-point stance” and “knows how to win with his hands and has mastered a few different pass rushing moves”. He projects as “a multi-year contributor for a Power 5 program and potentially an impact player on Saturdays”.

On the field, he sounds like a good fit. Off the field, not so much. He entered the portal in December, and his legal situation was resolved nearly two months ago.

He is still in the portal, which suggests none of the major programs are interested. Perhaps he ends up at a second-chance university like Liberty. Otherwise, he could be a JUCO candidate.

Dink Jackson, S, 6’1”, 175 lbs.

• High School: Eau Gallie, Melbourne, FL, 2021

• High School National Ranking: 312

• High School Rating: 0.8972, 4-star

• Origin: Marshall (previously Ole Miss)

• Entered Portal: May 1

Originally committed to Florida, Dink Jackson ultimately signed with Ole Miss out of high school, spurring offers from USC, Tennessee, FSU, and West Virginia. After one season, he transferred to Marshall, where he did not register a single snap on defense in 2022.

His 247 high school scouting report suggests he is a great athlete who plays with some measure of abandon:

Will make a hit. Gets downhill in a hurry. Plays a violent brand of football. Can move given 11.04 in the 100-meter dash.

Coverage has always been the question with Jackson. He has the size and speed of a cornerback, but his skillset is more aligned with a linebacker. Indeed, 247 posited that he “has the potential to become a new-age linebacker that doesn’t need to leave the field assuming he gets bigger”.

It’s been two years, and he has not gotten bigger. If his school hopping is any indication, commitment could be the issue. As such, he is not a likely match for the Hokies.

Anthony Rose, S, 6’1”, 190 lbs.

• High School: Miami Central, Miami, FL, 2022

• High School National Ranking: 402

• High School Rating: 0.8922, 4-star

• Origin: South Carolina

• Entered Portal: April 16

Anthony Rose redshirted in 2022 and did not appear in a game. He was suspended after being charged in March with illegal possession of an AR-15 style weapon. Needless to say, Shane Beamer will not be singing his praises, and Tech will surely take a pass. Rose will likely have to go the JUCO route if he wants to revive his career.

Any takers?

The transfer portal tends to generate two types of headlines: big names and high totals of transfers out from a given school. Neither captures the true nature of the thing.

Ultimately, the portal is about second (and sometimes third) chances. And that is why the recruiting rankings for portal entrants are so poor.

By the numbers alone, each of the five players analyzed in this article would be no brainers. Message boards would light up “Pry brings in another four-star transfer…” and the casual fan would be happy.

Disciplinary actions are sometimes made public, sometimes not, but arrests and convictions are always public. At some point, those metrics need to be incorporated into the overall player ratings. Doing so would certainly help fans and lessen scrutiny on coaches who appear to be passing on “four-star” transfers in favor of career backup three-star players.

I would not be surprised to learn that the Hokies are competing to land Conley and Mugharbil. Neither player has any (public) off the field issues, and both have the requisite talent. Given good coaching and the right fit with regard to scheme, both could be successful.

Still, given their experience in college so far, one has to imagine that their ceiling is quite a bit lower than it appeared when they were high school.

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Football Archaeology

Today's Tidbit... Player Transfers: What's Old Is New Again

We think of mass transfers and players following their coaches to new destinations as a condition of the 2020s, brought on by the portal and the one-time transfer provision. But college football witnessed mass transfers after both WWI and WWII. Thankfully, we did not need a world war to encourage a flood of transfers this time around, but it's worth loo…

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3 years ago · 2 likes · Timothy P. Brown

If you’re big into college football history - the kind of person who used to love listening to Ivan Maisel and Beano Cook on the ESPNU College Football podcast more than a decade ago (Editor’s note: has it really been that long?) - you will definitely want to subscribe to Football Archeology. New articles come out daily, and they are extremely engaging, with lots of great historical images.

On with the show

I was surprised to see Cam Johnson enter the transfer portal. He’s coming off a pretty major injury, but seemed in the hunt to get serious playing time, if not this year, then certainly next. One thing that stuck out about Johnson is his size - 165 lbs. when he signed his letter of intent and 165 lbs. in the spring of 2023, according to Hokiesports.com. That got me thinking about what makes a guy, not even one year into college, decide to transfer out. There are a lot of fit-related factors (homesick, sick family member far away, etc.) that are beyond quantification, but there are variables that we can analyze numerically.

I created a little dataset that, among other factors, included:

• The number of offensive/defensive snaps played in 2022

• The weights for each player in 2023 and 2022 (according to 247 Sports)

• Transfer Portal Status

I noticed that the guys who portaled out had half the year-on-year absolute value difference in weight as the guys from that class who remain on the team (7.3 vs. 14.0 lbs.). Considering weight change as a proxy measure, that begs the question, are guys who don’t fully buy in to the strength and conditioning program being pushed out?

Secondarily, I wondered if the number of snaps played in 2022 was associated with the absolute value difference in weight. In theory, guys who played more snaps would miss Friday lift sessions, which would make it harder to gain weight and get stronger.

Obviously, there are some serious limits to consider. While most high school players need to gain weight to get on the field in college, some don’t. Some need to lose weight, and the best players are usually close to their ideal weight when they first step foot on campus. So, perhaps looking at both snap counts and weight changes together can explain portal entrants. For example, a player who didn’t see the field and whose weight did not change could be judged as neither particularly talented nor a close adherent to the S&C program. Were these guys more likely to transfer?

Regressing our way to answers

First, I will state the obvious - the following regressions are not sufficiently powered to uncover anything outside of a very clear association (such is the challenge of analyzing decisions related to second year coaches). So, for simplicity’s sake, when a regression fails to reach statistical significance, I’m going to assert the blanket conclusion of on a case by case basis. Ideally, I would like to see all of the following regressions fail. There are other ways to measure commitment, many of which cannot be quantified, and I would hope that they are given sufficient weight when these decisions are made.

Is weight change (a proxy for S&C commitment) associated with entrance into the transfer portal?

Result: On a case by case basis (no statistical significance)

The Class of 2022 shows no connection between weight change from the moment of commitment until the spring of 2023 on the decision to enter the transfer portal. Statistically speaking, it wasn’t even close.

Nothing to see here folks. Or is there? Let’s keep digging.

Is the number of snaps played in 2022 associated with the absolute difference in weight?

Result: On a case by case basis (no statistical significance)

A little bit closer here. In the neighborhood, if not the ballpark.

Admittedly, we’re talking about a big neighborhood (low R Squared and high P-value), but let’s pull some more threads. We’ve gone from a P-value 0.437 to 0.182. Another 0.135 and we’ll hit statistical significance.

Is there an association between the players who needed to change their weight and the absolute difference in weight?

Result: On a case by case basis (no statistical significance)

For this one, I created a subjective dummy variable (0 or 1) to flag the players a reasonable person would say needed to gain or lose weight. For example, the aforementioned Cam Johnson needed to change his weight (gain) as did Xavier Chaplin (lose), but all three tight ends are in the acceptable range.

No dice again. With an R Squared approaching 0.1 and a P-value of 0.161, we’ve taken a quarter step forward, but still a ways off from statistical significance. Let’s see if we can get any traction with a multiple regression.

Is there an association between players who needed to change their weight, the absolute difference in weight change, and entrance into the transfer portal?

Result: On a case by case basis (no statistical significance)

In so many words, nope!

Not only did we not get within sniffing range of statistical significance, the R Squared number is barely greater than zero, meaning, the two variables explain about 3% of the difference between the players that portaled out and those who stayed.

Is there an association between the absolute change in weight, snaps played, and the decision to enter the transfer portal?

Result: On a case by case basis (no statistical significance)

Finally, let’s consider weight change and snaps played. If a guy didn’t play and didn’t get his body right, one could hypothesize that either the coaching staff would push him out or the player would be buried on the depth chart, see the writing on the wall, and hit the exits of his own accord.

Once again, the data do not allow us to move beyond the null hypothesis that there is no association between these factors.

Where does this leave us?

One of the problems with scientific research these days is that non-confirmatory studies are rarely published. However, it is just as important to report when you do not find an association as when you do. Perhaps next offseason I will revisit the players in this class and see if their weight changes from their senior year of high school through to August 2023 were associated with their playing time during the season.

For now, I am actually happy with these findings. I would hate to see a staff so wedded to players reaching the ideal weight in year one on campus that they push out guys who struggle to pack on (or lose) weight. Case in point: Dorian Strong. He’s still skinny, and he’s still an excellent player.

On Deck

In case you missed it, Will Stewart had a really enlightening conversation this week with Kevin and Robyn Jones from Triumph NIL. Among many topics, they talked about how NIL can play a role in great players choosing to forego early entry into the draft. Stewart noted that Michael Vick would have preferred to have stayed at Tech another year, having just figured out college (Editor’s note: I was just figuring out college midway through my third year at Tech, too). Jones added that he would have stayed for his senior season had there been NIL in 2004. Can you imagine the 2004 team with KJ in the backfield? That very well could have been a National Championship team.

Anyway, I’m really curious about the math behind such stay/go decisions. If you’re going to be the #1 pick, you have to go. But, at what point does the value of staying match the value of leaving. As the TSL Podcast interview makes clear, personal brand building is a big part of NIL, and one has to figure it can have major professional ramifications (both in regard to where a player is taken in the draft and what kind of non-NFL offers guys get). This could end up being a multi-part investigation. We’ll see. Should be interesting. Stay tuned!

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The 2021 Cincinnati Bearcats reminded me of 2010 Boise St. Coming off an undefeated regular season and last second loss to Georgia in a New Year’s Six game, the Bearcats began the season ranked in the AP Top 10 and with a realistic chance of making the playoff. If, that is, they could get through another regular season undefeated. At times the pressure seamed to get to them, but unlike Boise, they never cracked, and were rewarded with a semi-final game against defending National Champion Alabama.

Cincinnati lost that game 27-6, and the outcome was never really in doubt, but the Bearcats did not embarrass themselves. They limited big plays and forced the Crimson Tide to drive the length of the field in order to score. They also did not do anything stupid. They just got outplayed because Alabama had better players.

What really stood out to me in that game was the difference in the trenches. Cincy’s offensive line could not block Alabama’s defensive line. No shame there - few teams can block those guys. But with the Hokies hiring the man who coached that Cincinnati line, I was really curious what the story was, from a numbers perspective.

• Can this guy recruit?

• How good was the line play under his tutelage in 2021 (that unit was supposedly a strength of the team)?

• What does all this tell us about Crook as a coach and the impact he might have in Blacksburg?

A couple weeks ago, I posited that the Hokies could likely get a good teacher or a good recruiter, but not both. I closed that article with my definition of a successful hire:

There is enough talent in the offensive line room to field a unit that grades out in the Top 5 of the ACC in 2023. Reaching that level depends firmly on coaching and development. The ten players from the ‘22 and ‘23 classes will play a big role in determining the success or failure of Brent Pry’s tenure as head coach. Therefore, if I were him, I would go in search of the best on-field coach from the Joe Morehead coaching tree that $750k can buy. If he is someone from FCS that no one has heard of before, so be it. As long as he can simplify his teachings (I don’t want to see heads tying up feet this fall!), elicit consistent effort, and get his guys to execute the plays Tyler Bowen calls, I think he’ll do the trick.

The 2021 unit at Cincinnati was not necessarily Crook’s best, but it was his highest profile, and it was just a couple years ago. I think it is an excellent place to mine some data in order to quantify the quality of this hire.

On the Recruiting Trail

At first blush with Cincinnati’s offensive line recruiting numbers under Crook, well, I blushed. How on earth did Cincinnati make the playoff with those sorts of recruits blocking for Desmond Ridder and Jerome Ford? Did Virginia Tech just hire the second coming of Curt Newsome?

To get a sense of Crook’s work at Cincinnati, I compared his four recruiting classes to the four that preceded him. Crook was at Cincy from 2017-21, but I assigned only the 2018-21 classes to him, since his impact on the 2017 class was likely minimal at most.

When I frame it like that, ole Crooksy looks like a hotshot recruiter. The average national ranking of all players recruited to Cincinnati as linemen improved by 182 places with Crook as the offensive line coach. The average player rating and stars both increased by more than 0.2, and Crook brought in players who were one inch taller and 18 pounds heavier on average. That’s yeoman’s work right there!

If Crook can match that progress over the next four years in Blacksburg (admittedly, those are some huge ifs, but work with me here people), the numbers would look like this (in italics):

If the average Virginia Tech high school offensive line recruit over the next four cycles is a 6’6”, 311 lb. borderline 4-star recruit, Crook could achieve some measure of folk hero status. But before we commission a statue of the man, let’s do our due diligence with regard to the on-field performance of his players.

On the Field

Out of the five guys on that 2021 Cincinnati team that played more than 500 snaps, four committed to the Bearcats out of high school, while one was a transfer from UConn. Interestingly, this starting five featured a lot of afterthoughts on the recruiting trail.

Can you imagine trying to block Will Anderson and friends in the playoff with this bunch? There’s a reason the Bearcats only gained 218 total yards in that game (and 74 rushing). Crook is a good coach, but there is only so much a coach can do.

Over the course of that undefeated season, though, Crook coaxed some solid performances from a bunch of unheralded guys. Here are their PFF grades as a unit for the season:

At the individual level, only Dylan O’Quinn had a below average season (per PFF; he was actually a First Team All Conference selection), and as shown above, he was a probably an FCS-level player coming out of high school:

Remember, the baseline grade is 60, so in sum, Crook produced an above average unit with below average players. And Cincinnati won a whole bunch of games.

The Takeaway

Brent Pry nabbed a sneaky good offensive line coach in Ron Crook. His comments about the Crook hire, I think, are instructive (emphasis added):

"I am thrilled to add a coach of Ron Crook's caliber to our staff," said Virginia Tech Head Coach Brent Pry. "He brings a wealth of experience coaching offensive line across the Power Five level and in major bowl games. Coach Crook is a great teacher and has a reputation for building tough, physical offensive lines. Ron's time and ties to small college football in West Virginia and Pennsylvania means a lot to me. I know what he is about and what he will bring to our program."

There are not many coaches who have stints at Harvard (eight years), Stanford (two years), and West Virginia (four years) on their resume. The numbers suggest he is a good teacher and on-field coach, as well as someone who is capable of improving recruiting. In addition, he has coached in the following major bowl games:

• 2021 Cotton Bowl (CFP Semi-Final)

• 2020 Peach Bowl (New Years Six)

• 2012 Rose Bowl (BCS)

• 2011 Fiesta Bowl (BCS)

I doubt he will get Joe Rudolph-type money, but his track record definitely merits something north of $500k per year.

If you look at the staff in its totality, there is at least one coach with deep ties to just about every state in the six-hour driving radius. In this case, Crook is a direct replacement Rudolph.

On paper, the fit appears better between the various coaches, as well. I would not, in the least, be surprised if this staff performs at a level greater than the sum of its parts.

Of course, the 800 lb. gorilla in the room is Tyler Bowen as the quarterbacks coach. If I had to guess, I would say that trading Rudolph and Glenn for Crook and Elijah Brooks would save the Hokies some money. If I am right about that, perhaps they will hire some sort of quarterback guru to join the support staff and work solely on mechanics with the quarterbacks. It is a critical part of coaching QBs, but it is also not the the sort of thing that is done in-game, so it does not necessarily require an assistant coach (analysts are not supposed to actively coach during games, but that rule seems loosely enforced at best). I am very curious to see if there is a pre-2022 Pierson Prioleau-type guy who will come on board - a great coach who is not up for the rigors of in-person recruiting right now, possibly due to family obligations.

The QB coach part of the equation is really the only question mark outstanding. The Brooks hire has, deservedly, gotten lots of positive press, but as demonstrated, Ron Crook is also an excellent hire. On the whole, I am suddenly feeling much better about Tech’s chances in 2023.

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